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Summary
Since the global nancial crisis, there has been renewed focus on the analysis of sys-
temic risk. Systemic risk refers to possibility that vulnerabilities across the nancial
system and between the nancial system and the real economy will be triggered. As
a result, intermediation activities may be curtailed and a nancial crisis may occur.
There are a number of aspects to systemic risk and related nancial stability analy-
sis. First, imbalances and risk can accumulate in both the nancial system and in the
composition of economic activity during an economic upswing, due to either adverse
incentives or myopia by economic agents. Second, macro-nancial linkages and conta-
gion channels between nancial intermediaries not only amplify potential risk during
the boom period, but also exacerbate the economic impact when the cycle turns, or if
there is an adverse shock. This thesis focuses on two current issues in nancial stabil-
ity research for the banking sector, namely the analysis of bank funding risk during a
nancial crisis and the detection of unsustainable property price movements. Funding
risk and asset price bubbles, particularly in the commercial real estate market played
a signicant role in the origins of both the Irish and the global nancial crisis. Across
three chapters, this thesis presents original research on these topics using Irish data
as a statistical example.
Chapter one examines the determinants of weekly corporate deposit levels in Irish
banks over the period March 2009 to August 2010. This sample includes the early
stages of the Irish banking crisis, which began in 2008. The global nancial crisis
resulted in Irish banks experiencing more acute funding diculties than institutions
elsewhere. Using a unique high-frequency database and drawing on both the nancial
crisis and market discipline literature, the sensitivity of corporate depositors to move-
ments in both idiosyncratic and systemic risk factors is tested. There is statistical
evidence that measures of risk for the Irish banking sector such as implied ratings and
credit default swap spreads can explain corporate deposit levels over the sample, val-
idating the market discipline hypothesis. These results further provide an empirical
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link between counter-party credit risk and bank funding risks. Additionally, tensions
in European inter-bank markets are found to negatively impact corporate deposits
indicating contagion channels between funding markets during periods of systemic
stress. The empirical relationship between daily corporate and retail deposits is also
examined. Although retail deposit ows move in the same direction as corporate de-
posits, retail deposits appear to exhibit relatively higher inertia up to August 2010.
Chapter one has been re-drafted from a co-authored policy-orientated research paper
with Kieran McQuinn which is available as a Central Bank of Ireland Research Tech-
nical Paper (No.2/12) entitled Modelling the corporate deposits of Irish nancial
institutions: 2009-2010.
Expanding the dataset to early-2014, chapter two models the dynamic behaviour
of weekly customer deposits (i.e., both retail and corporate) held with Irish banks over
the period March 2009 to end-December 2013 using an ARDL(1,1) - GARCH(1,1)
framework. Over the sample, which covers the Irish systemic banking crisis, weekly
customer deposit ows are found to respond to measures of banking sector and
sovereign risk which is consistent with the theory of market discipline among de-
positors. Although the data cover resident and non-resident depositors, idiosyncratic
and Irish-specic risk factors seem to have more explanatory power for deposit growth.
Indicators of general stress in international nancial markets are found to be statisti-
cally insignicant. Once market-based risk factors are included in the model, no direct
macro-economic inuence is found. Over the sample, statistical evidence of a regime
shift is found, with deposits switching from a high variance regime to a low variance
regime with the onset of an EU/ECB/IMF Programme of assistance for Ireland in
early-December 2010. Interestingly, evidence of a GARCH-in-Mean eect indicates
that the conditional variance of customer deposits negatively aects deposit growth
rates over the sample. An adverse reaction to risk as proxied by the conditional
volatility would be consistent with ight-to-quality theories of deposit behaviour.
Chapter three analyses price developments in the Irish commercial property mar-
ket over the period 1985Q1 to 2012Q4 using time-series techniques. First, three dif-
ferent statistical approaches are used to test if prices can be explained by fundamental
determinants such as income, interest rates and credit. Evidence of some deviations
between actual and fundamental prices over the sample period is found. Second, two
popular models of price misalignment from the stock price literature are used to test
whether these estimated misalignments between actual prices and fundamentals (i.e.,
10
non-fundamental prices) suggest that there is an irrational fad or a rational bubble in
Irish commercial property prices over the period under study. To distinguish between
these two models, regime switching methodology is used. The study nds evidence
of a number of periods where commercial property prices deviate from fundamentally
determined values for a sustained period. The periods of estimated misalignment are
found to be broadly consistent across the various approaches. In testing between a
rational bubble and the irrational fad hypothesis, evidence of regime shifts over the
sample provide some support for the presence of a bubble. However, the point es-
timates of expected returns in each regime are not fully in-line with the theoretical
predictions of the rational bubble theory. Therefore, the results are not conclusive in
favour of the rational bubble hypothesis.
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Chapter 1
A High-Frequency Model of
Corporate Deposits: March
2009 to August 2010
1.1 Introduction
This chapter revisits the disciplining role of the standard deposit contract in the con-
text of the recent nancial crisis. In particular, the focus is on corporate deposits
and their behaviour during the initial stages of the Irish systemic banking crisis (i.e.,
March 2009 to December 2010). The Irish banking crisis occurred during the global
nancial crisis which began in 2007. Both crises were extremely costly for the af-
fected economies. Macro-nancial linkages combined with highly interconnected and
complex banking systems meant that the unwinding of excesses built up prior to 2006
in a number of these economies was sharp and disorderly. Consequently, signicant
economic output losses were recorded and many banks required nancial support and
liability guarantees from national authorities. These events have reinvigorated eco-
nomic research on banks and in particular, the risks inherent in their structure and
their role as risk transmitters to the real economy and other parts of the nancial
system. This chapter focuses on bank funding risk and specically, on deposits.
The original micro-economic models of banking show that the standard deposit
contract poses a signicant risk for banks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In these
models, banks provide an important intermediation role between savers and those
who oer productive investment opportunities. Savers, however, may face uncertain
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liquidity preferences in the future due to possible income shocks. The deposit contract
oered by banks provides insurance against such liquidity shocks. This liquidity
creation role comes at a cost, as banks cannot tie the deposit contract to savers'
individual liquidity preferences so deposits are generally oered on demand or for
short maturities. A bank's assets, by contrast, are generally less liquid. The ensuing
mismatch between the maturity of a bank's assets and liabilities increases a bank's
vulnerability to runs by depositors or other funding providers. In the Diamond-Dybvig
(1983) model, bank runs by depositors are driven by self-fullling expectations. If
depositors believe that others will run on a bank, it is optimal for all to withdraw funds
due to the assumption of a sequential service constraint and an illiquid investment
asset in the model. Such runs lead to costly bank liquidations. In the nancial crisis
literature, triggers for bank runs can be due to panic/mob psychology (Kindleberger,
1978), fears about the negative impact of an impending recession on future bank
returns (Gorton, 1988 and Allen and Gale, 1998) or as a result of a deterioration in
bank fundamentals (See Allen and Gale, 2007 for a full treatment of this topic).
In addition to consumption exibility, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that the
deposit contract provides another benet. The rst-come, rst-served assumption
creates an incentive for depositors to monitor the bank and if deemed risky, run on
the bank. The risk of bank runs, in turn, creates an incentive for banks to maintain
sound business models in normal times. Calormiris and Kahn, therefore, modify the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) representative bank framework to show that demandable
bank debt can solve agency problems in banking. First, it is assumed that banks are
monopolistic and the possibility of bank fraud is introduced. In certain states of
the world, bank managers face the incentive to abscond with depositor funds if the
realised value of their investments is less than aggregate deposit payments. Second,
some depositors actively monitor the bank by investing in receiving a signal about
future protability. Depositors are more likely to run when they receive bad signals
because there is a higher probability that bankers will abscond when realised returns
are low. Also in the event of a run, depositors will receive payment with certainty. In
good times, depositors will choose not to liquidate the bank which leads to a higher
pay-o but comes with the risk that the banker will abscond. Passive depositors also
gain indirectly from the disciplining eects of the active monitors. In equilibrium,
prot-maximising bankers will chose contracts that maximise social gains and lead to
the most ecient intermediation outcome. Demand deposits contracts are optimal in
this context.
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There is a signicant empirical literature testing the validity of this market dis-
cipline hypothesis. Many of these studies examine the sensitivity of deposit ows
or deposit rates to changes in measures of bank nancial soundness. If the market
discipline theory holds, there should be a negative relationship between deposit ows
and bank risk. Deposit rates may increase in line with risk as banks may have to
oer a premium to compensate depositors for higher levels of uncertainty about fu-
ture protability. Flannery (1998) and Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) provide a good
review of the empirical literature in this area.
This chapter investigates the key determinants of corporate deposits in Irish banks
using a unique high-frequency database of deposits over the period March 2009
through December 2010. Specically, in line with the market discipline literature,
the sensitivity of depositors to movements in both idiosyncratic and systemic risk
factors is tested. The focus is on corporate depositors given their potentially higher
resources and incentives to invest in monitoring banks and to actively manage their in-
vestments. The role of macro-nancial linkages and contagion across funding markets
is also examined.
While the recent nancial crisis revealed the precariously short-term sources of
wholesale funding for many international nancial institutions, the relatively frag-
ile nature of Irish banks' funding structure pre-2007 was particularly evident. The
Irish banking sector, which had witnessed signicantly concentrated lending in the
property market throughout the past decade, was funded throughout this period by
increasingly short-term non-retail liabilities. Funding diculties in late-2008, led to
the introduction of a broad guarantee on certain liabilities for Irish banks by the
national authorities.
Funding risks remained to the fore throughout 2009 and 2010. Investors became
increasingly worried about the potential fragility of Irish banks' balance sheets as the
values of Irish property continued to contract and the economy shrank. As the global
crisis unfolded, risk aversion pervaded international capital markets. The emergence
of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe from mid-2010 further exacerbated funding
diculties and created a self-reinforcing negative dynamic between the Irish sovereign
and the domestic banking system. Consequently, over the period 2009 to mid-2010
the funding durations of Irish institutions moved to ever shorter maturities, wholesale
funding costs increased and the ability of these institutions to access certain categories
of funding became limited. Compounding the diculties was the deterioration in
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the state of the Irish public nances. The situation confronting the Irish system
exacerbated considerably in the nal quarter of 2010 as the sovereign crisis escalated.
The net consequence was that the Irish nancial system became substantially reliant
on liquidity support from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Irish Central
Bank. Inevitably, Ireland, in November 2010, negotiated a scal support programme
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and
the European Central Bank (ECB). The scale of the Irish banking crisis and the
central role of funding issues, therefore, provides a useful case study to study deposit
dynamics.
The model focuses on a period of relative stability identied within the time period
under question. While the period in general occurs after the initiation of the Irish
nancial crisis in 2008, a period of relative stability is observed in the aggregate
customer deposit levels in Irish banks up to August 2010. A key turning point for
both the retail and corporate deposit series is found to be 20 August 2010. The levels
of both series are found to exhibit a marked downward trend from this date until the
end of the sample (i.e., end 2010). Therefore a model of corporate deposits is specied
with the estimation sample running from March 2009 to August 2010.
The specication for corporate deposits controls for bank-specic indicators of
nancial soundness such as the implied credit rating for Irish banks as estimated by
Kamakura, 5-year senior Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and aggregate funding
market conditions as proxied by the 3-month Euribor/ Overnight Index Swap (OIS)
spread. The results show that measures of risk for the Irish banking sector have some
explanatory power for corporate deposits over our sample. Specically, a deterioration
in these risk factors has a negative inuence on corporate deposits, validating the
market discipline hypothesis and providing an empirical link between counter-party
credit risk and bank funding risks. The CDS spread may also be controlling for
changes in sovereign risk given the banking stabilisation measures undertaken by
the Irish authorities during the crisis. Over the estimation period, there is a notable
positive correlation between the sovereign and bank CDS spreads. Sovereign measures
of risk become insignicant or have the incorrect sign, once the specication controls
for banking sector risk.
Tensions in European interbank markets are also found to negatively impact cor-
porate deposits indicating contagion channels between funding markets during periods
of systemic stress. During the global nancial crisis, concerns about counter-party
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credit risk and higher preferences for liquidity led to a period of signicant dislocation
in international funding markets (Some empirical investigations of the determinants
of interbank spreads are Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009) and Fukuda (2012)).
Corporate depositors in Irish banks appear to be inuenced by such developments.
This result may be due to their own liquidity needs, general risk aversion towards
banks or towards Irish banks in particular.
The chapter also investigates the relative stickiness of retail deposits compared
with corporate deposits. Our model shows that corporate deposits react to negative
signals about the nancial health of Irish banks and general stress in other funding
markets. Of interest are possible intra-deposit dynamics and likelihood that outows
in corporate deposits are associated with retail deposit withdrawals up to August
2010. The presence of a long-run relationship between the stock of retail and corpo-
rate deposits within an error-correction framework is examined, thereby allowing the
perceived stickiness of retail versus corporate deposits to be estimated. Although
retail deposit ows are found to move in the same direction as corporate deposits us-
ing causality tests, retail deposits do not quickly adjust to deviations in the long-run
relationship between the two categories. Less resources to monitor banks, switching
costs and high levels of inertia may explain the relative stickiness of retail deposits
over the sample.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the de-
posit data while the relevant literature is discussed in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4 a
model of corporate deposits is specied. A subsequent section addresses inter-deposit
dynamics. A nal section concludes and provides a discussion of further work.
1.2 Irish customer deposit data (February 2009 - De-
cember 2010)
This chapter draws on a Central Bank of Ireland internal dataset containing the
net movement across a number of key funding sources for Irish nancial institutions.
Funding liabilities can be broadly decomposed into three categories namely, deposits
both customer and interbank, debt securities and other secured funding such as repur-
chase agreements. The daily net ow is dened as the dierence between the value of
total funding inows and outows for each funding category. The full dataset covers
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customer deposits1 and debt capital markets and begins on 23 February 2009. The
analysis here focuses primarily on the aggregate retail and corporate deposit books of
the Irish banks. Deposit gures for Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFI) are
included in the corporate category. The data are consolidated on a group basis and
are available at a daily frequency. The banks covered by this dataset are those retail
banks that are currently headquartered in Ireland, namely, Bank of Ireland, Allied
Irish Banks plc (including Educational Building Society) and permanent tsb. The
dataset also contains banks that are no longer in existence such as Anglo Irish Bank
Corporation plc and Irish Nationwide Building Society. During the Irish crisis, the
Irish banking sector underwent signicant consolidation which reduced the number of
retail banks from six to three.
To facilitate empirical analysis, the daily net ows were transformed into stocks
using internal supervisory funding prole data. In particular, using the historical net
ow data, the value of outstanding corporate and retail deposits as at February 2011,
were adjusted to back out a time-series of outstanding amounts for both categories.
These data may not, however, correspond exactly to funding prole data at various
points in time given potential timing issues with underlying transactions for the net
ows data (e.g., trade date versus value date etc). However, this series should capture
broad trends in the underlying net ows data. The focus is on the period 23 February
2009 to 2 December 2010, as this interval covers a phase of considerable nancial
stress in Ireland.
Figure 1.1 plots the aggregate series of our transformed data as an index. The base
for the index is end-August 2010. What is immediately observable is the sharp decline
in the series from late-August 2010 to the end of the sample. As a result, for much of
the analysis, the sample is separated into pre and post end-August 2010. Table 1.1
presents summary statistics for the aggregate deposit data over the total period and
for the two sub-samples. The summary statistics for the corporate deposit ows
show that the mean daily percentage outow for this category exceeds that of retail
deposits over all sample periods. The relatively higher standard error and min/max
range also conrm the volatility of corporate deposits during the crisis. The average
daily percentage outow across both categories increased after end-August 2010. The
largest daily outow for both categories also occurs in the latter period.
There may be a number of factors explaining the decline in deposits from late-
1Interbank deposits are not included in the dataset.
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August 2010. First, the expiration of the original guarantee scheme, the Credit Insti-
tutions Financial Support (CIFS) scheme in end-September 2010 resulted in a signif-
icant proportion of the Irish banks' term debt falling due during this month2. There
were concerns about the scale of the Irish banks' renancing commitments during this
time. It was not clear if there was sucient market appetite to roll this debt and re-
issue under the revised guarantee scheme, the Credit Institutions Eligible Liabilities
Guarantee (ELG). Furthermore, from late-Summer 2010, there was an intensication
of the self-reinforcing negative dynamic between the Irish sovereign and the banking
sector in the context of the initial phase of the European sovereign debt crisis. In-
vestors were concerned about the capacity of the Irish sovereign to meet the costs of
restructuring and recapitalising the banking sector. Moody's downgraded the Irish
sovereign on 19 July 2010 while Standard and Poor's (S&P) cut the long-term rating
on 24 August 2010. The Irish 10-year sovereign bond yields reached 6 per cent per
annum for the rst time on 16 August 2010 before following a general upward trend
until the end of our sample. An application for external assistance by the Irish Gov-
ernment from the EU/IMF and the ECB followed in late-November 2010 amidst a
continuing outow of deposit levels from the Irish system. The deterioration in the
measures of sovereign risk from end-August 2010 may have had implications for the
perceived protection of State support by depositors in Irish banks.
1.3 Literature on deposits and bank funding risk
In specifying a model of corporate deposits, particularly over a period of some distress
in market funding conditions, the market discipline literature and recent papers on
bank funding risks during the global nancial crisis provide a useful guide.
Given the link between solvency and liquidity, a number of studies have investi-
gated the disciplining forces of banks' creditors. The disciplining eects of short-term
or subordinated debt and deposits are the focus of such papers. As noted in the
introduction, the origins of the market discipline literature can be traced to the the-
oretical models of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991). The
latter paper shows that demandable debt can provide incentives for banks to reduce
risk-taking behaviour due to possibility of a bank run. As banks engage in maturity
transformation, the sector is particularly vulnerable to liquidity risks and bank runs.
Sironi (2003) notes that there are two aspects to the bank discipline literature. The
2This guarantee was introduced by the Irish authorities in September 2008.
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rst relates to the ability of investors to appreciate the scale of risk taking by banks
and inuence this behaviour by increasing the cost (and/or reducing the availability)
of funding. The second aspect investigates whether market prices contain useful infor-
mation on the nancial position of banks for bank supervisors. This chapter focuses
on the former approach. Flannery (1998) and Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) provide
a good review of the empirical literature on this area. As we shall see in the following
examples, the empirical results appear to dier by market and by bank characteristic.
Hori, Ito and Murata (2009) make use of a large panel of deposit-taking institutions
in Japan over the period 1992 to 2002 to examine if depositors are able to distinguish
between healthy and risky institutions. They nd evidence in favour of this hypoth-
esis during the Japanese crisis. The authors also contend that the scale of the risk
sensitivities are high enough to inuence bank managers. Size is found to be an impor-
tant factor as the paper nds that depositors at large institutions are more sensitive
to changes in bank risk that those at smaller institutions. In terms of methodology,
Hori, Ito and Murata (2009) look at the impact of bank-level indicators of risk on both
deposit growth and deposit interest rates while also controlling for type of nancial
institution (i.e., banks versus credit cooperatives) and for structural changes in the
Japanese market. To overcome simultaneity problems of supply/demand equations,
reduced form specications for both deposit growth and interest rates are estimated.
Fundamental variables include the capital-asset ratio and bank protability (i.e., the
ratio of operational prots to total assets).
Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) also test for the presence of market discipline by
depositors across European banks and banks in the United States (US) over the
period 1997 to 2007. The paper is motivated by the discussion during the crisis on the
potential adverse impact of policy measures on depositor discipline such as increasing
coverage under deposit protection schemes and protecting systemically important
banks. To this end, Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) examine how deposit growth and
deposit risk premia (i.e., deposit rates) respond to changes in measures of bank risk
through a number of empirical applications in the period prior to the crisis. First,
tests are run separately on both US and European samples as the authors contend
that the perceived probability of bank bail-outs is higher in Europe. The empirical
results reveal that depositor discipline is relatively higher in US, consistent with a
priori expectations. The second application controls for size with a threshold of
$50 billion in total assets. The results show that depositor discipline is lower for
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larger institutions, which contrasts with Hori et al., 2009. The authors also examine
the impact of being listed on the stock market. Depositor discipline is found to be
higher at smaller listed institutions relative to smaller unlisted banks reecting the
availability of nancial information. For larger banking institutions, the authors nd
relatively higher discipline at unlisted institutions. Finally, the paper attempts to
identify ratios to which depositors respond more rapidly. Equity ratios are found to
be more important than measures of loan performance or asset quality. In terms of
methodology, the paper employs three dierent empirical models, namely, reduced
form models of both deposit growth and rates, joint determination models to capture
interrelated supply and demand dynamics and nally, dynamic models which capture
gradual adjustment in the context of switching costs or inertia. Bank risk-taking
behaviour is proxied by the ratio of equity to assets and a measure of asset quality
such as the ratio of net charge-os, loan loss reserves or non-performing loans to total
loans.
A number of papers contend that a certain denition of deposits, namely, core
deposits are more sticky than other forms of deposits and may be rate inelastic.
The denition of core deposits varies across the literature. Feldman and Schmidt
(2001) dene core deposits as checking/savings accounts, money market deposits and
time deposits, while Berlin and Mester (1999) measure core deposits as those with
a value less than $100,000.3 Song and Thakor (2007) use the provision of liquidity
and advisory services as the dening factor for core deposits. They exclude brokered
certicates of deposit, large time deposits and any other deposits where no services
are provided from the denition and instead label this category as purchased money.
The presence of deposit insurance and potential switching costs are posited as reasons
for higher levels of inertia on these types of deposit. This literature provides some
rationale for the belief that certain categories of customer deposits should be relatively
stable in normal times. The presence of deposit insurance, however, may also reduce
the incentives for depositors to monitor banks. In the market discipline literature some
authors distinguish between insured and uninsured deposits to test this hypothesis.
Looking specically at the United States, Goldberg and Hudgins (1996) investigate
the existence of depositor discipline during the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis. These
authors nd evidence that there was a decrease in the share of uninsured deposits
in total deposits in those Savings and Loan Associations with a higher likelihood
3In an alternative specication, small value time deposits are also excluded from the denition.
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of failure over the period 1984 to 1989. In terms of methodology, the paper rst
estimates a logistic model for the probability of default which is, in turn, nested in a
model of uninsured deposits.
Another US study by Hannen and Hanweck (1988) tests for the presence of market
discipline in the market for large (i.e., over $100,000) uninsured certicates of deposits
(CD). This paper focuses on interest rate spreads (over the risk free rates) on various
CD maturities in 1985 and estimates the sensitivity of these spreads to insolvency
risk. The authors nd that indicators of bank risk such as the standard deviation of
return on assets, measures of the probability of insolvency and the capital/asset ratio
all impact rates on jumbo CDs consistent with the market discipline hypothesis.
Prior to the crisis, increasing reliance on short-terms sources of wholesale funding
became a feature of the commercial banking industry in certain markets. The recent
crisis showed that certain categories of banks' funding did not yield the associated
diversication benets during market dislocation. This feature was particularly evi-
dent in global money and credit markets. Therefore many papers have emerged since
the crisis began on the risks associated with wholesale funding. It is likely that some
large corporate depositors may act like wholesale funding providers for a number of
reasons.
First, they are more likely to have higher resources than retail depositors and so be
in a better position to actively manage their investments. They may, therefore, react
to similar signals monitored by debt holders and other nancial intermediaries about
the nancial health of individual banks or about the sector as a whole. Observed
tensions in international funding markets may signal to corporates that certain banks
are a risky investment, especially if these banks are reliant on these funding markets.
Such reactions can create indirect contagion channels across funding markets. The
deposit run on the mortgage lender Northern Rock in the United Kingdom (UK) in
September 2007 shows the sequencing of modern bank runs and is discussed in Shin
(2009). Shin highlights that withdrawals by wholesale and large informed depositors
preceded the eventual run by retail depositors. Second, institutional investors may
have investment thresholds such as the level of CDS spreads or a certain credit rating
that cannot be surpassed for regulatory or internal risk management reasons. Conse-
quently as soon as these limits are breached, such investors will withdraw their funds.
Given the potential similarities between corporate deposits and short-term wholesale
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funding, it is useful to review the literature on the latter to help specify a model of
corporate deposits.
A recent paper by Huang and Ratnovski (2010) provides theoretical proof that
under certain circumstances wholesale funding can be destabilising to nancial sta-
bility. To extend the Calomiris and Kahn (1991) model (CK), Huang and Ratnovski
(2010) introduce a costless but noisy public signal into the CK theoretical framework.
This extension shows the potentially negative eects of wholesale funding on nancial
stability in addition to the positive rst order eects of market discipline in the CK
model. The actions of wholesale nanciers are shown to be socially optimal only when
fully informed. Specically, the presence of this signal serves to reduce the incentives
of wholesale investors to monitor the bank. Further, when wholesale investors have
a senior claim to the liquidated assets, it is shown that these nanciers have higher
incentives to liquidate the bank (i.e., refuse to roll over funding) based on noisy public
information. As a result, such investors pose a renancing risk and contribute to inef-
cient bank runs if the information is not accurate. It is assumed that retail investors
are passive and risk insensitive in the model possibly due to deposit insurance and
are not aware of the noisy signal. The authors draw the conclusion that these nega-
tive externalities are more applicable to banks that have a large exposure to tradable
assets with freely available public information such as credit ratings and prices. The
results therefore apply to highly correlated nancial systems with readily available
but noisy market-based indicators of risk. Huang and Ratnovski (2010) contend that
this analysis is more applicable to the current business models of banks than the CK
framework as the crisis revealed the volatility of short-term wholesale funding.
Using a theoretical framework, Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2010) describe
how nancial institutions can experience an inability to roll short-term funding in the
presence of only a small change in the value of collateral underpinning this debt and
without other distortions such as asymmetric information. Such events can occur if the
roll-over frequency of debt is higher than the arrival of news and when all potential
buyers of this debt have a short-term investment strategy. In this instance, the
recoverable value of debt may fall below its fundamental value and even high-quality
collateral will not be traded. Such market freezes were observed in the asset-backed
securities market and in money markets during the recent global nancial crisis. Given
the signicant dislocation in the latter market during the crisis, a number of papers
have investigated empirically the roles of credit risk and liquidity risk on interbank
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spreads during this time. Some examples are Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009)
and Fukuda (2012).
There has also been a growth in the literature addressing the dierent types of
liquidity risk during a crisis. Liquidity risk can broadly be divided into two categories,
namely, market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. There are a few denitions
of both categories in the literature. Some examples are Brunnermeier and Pederson
(2009), Tirole (2011) and Borio (2010). As noted in Tirole (2011), market liquidity
can broadly be considered as pertaining to the asset side of a bank's balance sheet
while funding liquidity relates to the liability side although both categories may be
correlated, particularly in a crisis. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a the-
oretical link between the market liquidity of an asset and the liquidity funding risk
faced by traders in this asset during a period of nancial turmoil. Drehman and
Nikolaou (2013) use a proxy for funding liquidity risks faced by banks (i.e., based on
bidding behaviour at ECB open market operations) and empirically test the theoret-
ical relationship between market and funding liquidity over the period 2005 to 2007.
The authors nd that a signicant and negative relationship emerges between the two
categories from 2007. This nding is in accordance with the theory as the relationship
is only signicant when banks experience constrained funding patterns in the context
of declining asset prices and low levels of market liquidity. Borio (2010) contends that
underpinning the development of most liquidity crises is a self-reinforcing dynamic be-
tween market liquidity risk, funding liquidity risk and counter-party credit risk. In an
expansionary period, this dynamic can lead to highly-leveraged balance sheets and in
this context can lead to a sudden evaporation in liquidity during a period of aggregate
nancial stress.
The link between liquidity issues and the real economy is explored in Shin (2010).
This book entitled Risk and Liquidity deals with the endogeneity of nancial risk
and how the under-pricing of this risk played a key role in the global nancial cri-
sis. Specically, the author looks at the emergence of systemic risk and the role
played by leverage and liquidity risk in the propagation of the global crisis. Prior
to the crisis, Shin contends the nancial system became increasingly interconnected
with the emergence of long intermediation chains between end-borrowers and original
lenders. Shin then characterises a crisis as a situation where highly leveraged and
constrained participants signicantly reduce their exposures in response to a decline
in prices, increase in measured risk or a decline in correlations, thereby leading to fur-
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ther decreases in prices (i.e., so called liquidity black holes )4. Consequently there
is widespread deleveraging across the system and credit supply to the real economy
is curtailed.
The above papers on funding risks during the global nancial crisis highlight the
inherent fragility of bank funding during periods of severe nancial stress. The ows of
bank funding can be sensitive to general investor sentiment and the nancial position
of funding providers in addition to the credit-worthiness of the deposit-taking bank.
Therefore any model of deposits needs to consider the impact of both macro-nancial
conditions and bank nancial soundness indicators.
1.4 Specication of corporate deposit model
In specifying a model for Irish corporate deposits a number of possible explanatory
variables are identied. Borrowing from the market discipline literature and conjunc-
tural analysis of events in 2009/2010, these variables should reect idiosyncratic/bank
risk or aggregate risk developments. Given the high frequency nature of the deposit
data, the focus is mainly on market-based indicators. Therefore, the sample is re-
stricted to Irish banks listed over the full period under study (i.e., late-February 2009
to early-December 2010), namely, Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland and Irish Life
& Permanent plc.5 To minimise the presence of noise in daily observations, weekly
data are used for the estimation of the model.6 The estimation sample is shortened
to the period prior to 20 August 2010, as a clear turning point emerges subsequent to
this date in terms of the movements of corporate deposits in the Irish nancial sys-
tem (see Section 1.2). Consequently, there are 74 observations in the sample covering
the period from the week beginning 2 March 2009 through to 20 August 2010. The
following possible explanatory variables are identied,
 3-month Euribor/OIS spread,
 Implied credit rating,
 Credit default swap (CDS) spreads.
4Additionally, it is contended that marketable assets (i.e., through mark-to-market accounting
and securitisation) played a key role in the nancial crisis by amplifying the feedback mechanism
between agents and their environment.
5Anglo Irish Bank was delisted in January 2009 following nationalisation and so is excluded from
the sample.
6Daily data were converted to weekly averages using the RATS software programme.
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The 3-month Euribor/OIS spread is commonly used as a measure of tension in the
euro money markets. As is common practice the spread is measured in basis points.
This variable is included as a measure of general funding risk to which investors or
corporate deposit holders may react. A negative relationship is expected.
The implied credit rating variable is estimated by Kamakura Risk Information
Services (KRIS) and provides a quantitative measure of nancial soundness. The im-
plied credit rating model by Kamakura is based on rm-specic attributes, the term
structure of default probabilities for the rm as estimated by Kamakura, industry
classications, macroeconomic factors and the historical behaviour of ratings agen-
cies (KRIS, 2011). Based on all of these factors a measure of a likely credit rating,
conditional on having a rating, is estimated for the public rm. Credit ratings data
from Standard and Poor's are used by Kamakura. The credit rating variable is added
to the model using a linear scale where 1 corresponds to the highest rating, AAA and
21 to the lowest, D. Therefore, an increase in this variable is expected to lead to a de-
crease in corporate deposits. Implied ratings were available for all three listed banks
over the estimation period. However, it was decided to go with AIB given the results
of Granger causality tests,7 which suggested its leading role within the industry.
The median 5-year senior CDS spread in basis points for the three listed Irish
banks in the sample is used as a measure of perceived credit worthiness. CDS spreads
are not used by Kamakura in the implied rating model. A negative relationship is
also expected with corporate deposits if the market discipline hypothesis holds.
1.4.1 Estimation and results
The model is estimated in an error correction framework using the Engle-Granger
(1987) two-step methodology. This model allows us to control for both long- and
short-run dynamics. All four series in log format are rst tested for the presence of
a unit root. In log levels all series are found to be non-stationary.8 The series were
subsequently transformed into rst dierences and the unit root tests were performed
on the growth rates of the variables.
The three unit root tests carried out are the ADF-GLS test by Elliot et al. (1996),
with the lag length chosen on the basis of the modied AIC suggested by Ng and
7To perform Granger causality tests, a VAR is estimated using only the daily deposit ows of the
covered institutions. Following standard lag length tests, the nal application has a lag of 5 days
and the estimation is conducted over the period February 2009 to August 2010.
8Results are not presented in the interests of brevity but are available upon request.
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Perron (2001), the classical Dickey-Fuller (1981) and the Philips-Perron (1988) tests.
To ensure robustness, a range of lag lengths were chosen for the latter two tests. The
results are presented in Table 1.2. Although the ADF-GLS test only rejects the null
hypothesis of a unit root for the dierenced CDS spreads, both the Dickey-Fuller and
the Philips-Peron tests suggest that all dierenced variables are stationary at 4 lags9.
Therefore, it is assumed that all transformed variables are integrated of order zero.
A number of tests for the presence of a cointegrating vector were conducted on
the residuals of the long-run equation. In addition to the ADF-GLS test, the Engle-
Granger (1987) test and the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test
by Sargan and Bhargava (1983) are applied. Critical values for both tests are from
MacKinnon (1991) and Banerjee et al. (1993). The lag length for the Augmented
Engle-Granger test was chosen on the basis of standard selection critera (e.g., AIC,
SBC). The tests were minimised at lag length of one. Both of these tests reject the
null of a unit root. The ADF-GLS test, however, suggests that the residuals are not
stationary. Drawing on the evidence for cointegration, the following long-run model
is estimated
ct = 0 + 1spreadt + 2aibiratt + 3medcdst + t (1.1)
where spreadt refers to the spread between 3-month Euribor and the euro 3-month
overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, aibirat refers to the implied credit rating of Allied
Irish Banks plc (AIB) as estimated by Kamakura and medcds represents the median
CDS spread.
Table 1.3 presents the results while Figure 1.2 compares the actual and tted log
corporate deposits along with the residuals. All explanatory variables are found to
have the expected negative relationship with our dependent variable. As the variables
are in log format, the long-run elasticities show that the the implied credit rating ex-
erts the highest inuence among the explanatory variables. As mentioned previously,
this variable is itself estimated from a reduced form model which controls for other
indicators of nancial fragility such as default probabilities as well as the histori-
cal behaviour of the credit rating agency S&P and, therefore, may provide an early
indication of future ratings actions. An increase in this rating implies that the funda-
mentals of the bank have deteriorated and may be downgraded (if the rating diers
9In the case of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the number of lags refers to the number of
additional lags in the autoregression (Estima, 2012).
27
from the actual) if S&P assigned a rating based on default probabilities and applied a
similar rating approach as it had used over the period 1990 to 2008 (KRIS, 2011). The
negative relationship clearly shows that corporate deposit holders can exert market
discipline by withdrawing funds when the nancial condition of deposit-taking banks
weakens. Also corporates appear to be sensitive to our indicator of credit risk, namely
the median CDS premia across our listed banks. The model, therefore, shows that
there is a link between counter-party credit risk and liquidity funding risk. Addition-
ally, the importance of conditions in the inter-bank market (Euribor/OIS spread) in
the model indicate that funding markets are not segmented and that tensions in one
market can spill-over into other funding categories.
Diagnostic tests of the long-run residuals reveal some evidence of serial correlation.
To control for this, fully-modied ordinary least squares (FM-OLS)10 is used. All
variables remain signicant and have the hypothesised sign (Table 1.3).
Corporate deposits were covered by an Irish Government guarantee during the
period under study and therefore could be considered as core deposits based on the
literature. During a nancial crisis, however, the solvency of the insurer is also likely
to play a role. The European sovereign crisis emerged in May 2010 with concerns
about the scal sustainability of Greece. By late-Summer market concerns spread
to other peripheral countries such as Ireland. International investors were worried
about the capacity of peripheral European states to meet scal obligations. Attention
in international markets began to focus on Ireland given the scale of the banking
stabilisation measures being undertaken by the Government at that time and the
strains emerging in the Irish public nances. The policy response to the crisis created
a link between the sovereign and the Irish banks. Such measures began in September
2008 with the introduction of the Government guarantee on banks' liabilities and also
included recapitalisations, nationalisations and the establishment of a bad bank
(National Asset Management Agency-NAMA) over the course of 2009 and 2010. See
the Oce of the Comptroller and Auditor General (2011) for more details on the
banking stabilisation measures. Some details on the various international guarantee
schemes introduced in 2008 and deposit insurance schemes are discussed in Schich
(2008).
10According to Enders (2010, pg. 426-427), inference may be inappropriate if there is evidence
of serial correlation in the errors of the cointegrating vector. Endogeneity may also be an issue. In
this instance, the procedure of Phillips and Hansen (1990) may be used instead. This procedure
adds leads and lags of changes in the explanatory variables to the regression and adjusts the t
statistics from the original equation using a modied version of the variance of the error term from
the expanded equation.
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Sovereign variables (e.g., bond spreads, CDS spreads) were found to be insigni-
cant or had the wrong sign over the sample period once bank specic risk had been
controlled for (Table 1.4). The variable on Irish banks' CDS spreads for the banks
may be picking up some of the sovereign issues given the aforementioned links between
the sovereign and the banks. Figure 1.3 shows the high levels of positive correlation
between the sovereign CDS spreads and median CDS spreads for the Irish banks
between end-February 2009 and-August 2010. Therefore although we cannot disen-
tangle the impact of sovereign and bank-specic risk in this specication, it is likely
that both factors may be inuencing deposits over our sample.
The results of the static OLS are included in the short-run model. Specically, the
lagged residuals from the long run model are incorporated into the following short-run
model.
4ct =  (ct 1   0   1spreadt 1   2aibiratt 1   3medcdst 1)
+
pX
i=0
i 4 spreadt i +
pX
i=0
i 4 aibiratt i +
pX
i=0
i 4medcdst i + ut (1.2)
Both the current value and the rst lag of each of the dierenced log implied rating,
the dierenced log median CDS spread and the dierenced log Euribor/OIS spread
are included as possible explanatory variables. Therefore p equals 1.
The results are contained in Table 1.5. Only the error correction term was found
to have explanatory power for deposit changes so the insignicant variables are ex-
cluded from the nal short-run specication (Table 1.6). The error correction term
is found to be highly signicant and negative. The equation is balanced due to the
presence of cointegration between the variables in levels and the fact that the short-
run variables are integrated of order zero. The estimated coecients suggest that if
there is a deviation between the actual and the long-run level of corporate deposits,
36 per cent of this gap will be closed in a week. This results suggests quite a fast
adjustment by corporate deposits to any deviations from long-run levels over our
sample period. The other short-run explanatory variables turn out to be statistically
insignicant. Figure 1.4 shows the actual and tted values of the short-run model
and the corresponding residuals.
A number of standard diagnostic tests on the model are also conducted and the
results are contained in Table 1.7. The correlogram of the short-run residuals indi-
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cate stationarity; a nding further conrmed by the Ljung-Box (1978) Q test. The
Breusch-Godfrey (1978) Lagrange Multiplier Test conrms the absence of serial cor-
relation. White's (1980) test also does not reject the null of homoskedasticity and we
nd no evidence of ARCH eects in the residuals. The Jarque-Bera (1987) test also
does not reject that the residuals are normally distributed.
It is possible that there may be some structural change within the estimation
period. To ensure the robustness of our error correction term, the stability of the
coecient using recursive estimation of the short-run model is examined. The ini-
tial estimation period for the exercise is limited to between 23 February 2009 to 28
February 2010 being mindful of sample length (i.e., 52 observations). The end-date
is extended sequentially up to the end of the full estimation sample. Figure 1.5 plots
the value of each estimated coecient and the corresponding estimated +/-2 standard
deviation band or condence interval. The coecient appears relatively stable and
statistically signicant.
1.4.2 Out-of-sample performance
In the above estimation, the model is run on weekly data over the period early-March
2009 to mid-August 2010. The short-run model is also simulated beyond the end-date
to see if it could have predicted the declining trend after late-August. Actual values
for the explanatory variables are used in the exercise. The simulation period is up to
late-October 2010. Figure 1.6 compares the estimation results of the short-run model
and the actual weekly percentage changes of corporate deposits. The model clearly
fails to predict the dislocated period in Q4. The signicant dierence between the
two series indicates that other factors are driving the corporate deposits during this
time. The intensication of sovereign risk concerns may be one such factor. Although
the various measures of sovereign risk were not found to be signicant in the initial
estimation process, it may be possible that the relationship intensies post-August
2010.
1.5 Examining inter-deposit dynamics
During the nancial crisis, it has been observed how corporate deposit gures have
been much more volatile than those of retail deposits. This is driven, in part, by
the prole of the investor base as large corporate depositors may be more sensitive
30
to negative news or developments in nancial markets. The model shows that cor-
porate deposits react to negative signals about the nancial health of Irish banks
and general stress in other funding markets. Moreover, institutional investors may
have investment thresholds such as the level of CDS spreads or a certain credit rating
that cannot be surpassed for regulatory reasons. Internal risk management thresholds
such as limits to sovereigns or certain sectors may also dictate the investment prac-
tices of corporates or non-bank nancial intermediaries. Some papers have, however,
contended that retail depositors will also run on banks during nancial crises and
can distinguish between healthy and weak banks (see Section 1.3). Further, we saw
in Section 1.2 that retail deposit outows from Irish banks were also recorded after
August 2010. Focusing on the period of relative stability up to August 2010, possible
intra-deposit dynamics are examined and the likelihood that outows in corporate
deposits are associated with retail deposit withdrawals is tested.
While corporate ows tend to be more volatile in nature for a variety of institu-
tional reasons, there is also likely to be a long-term relationship between the stock of
corporate and retail deposits held by nancial institutions. The possibility of such a
relationship is explored within a Vector autoregression (VAR) framework by initially
running standard Granger-Causality tests for both the growth rate and levels of cor-
porate and retail deposits. The results from the VAR are in Table 1.8.11 For both
the levels and growth rates of the ows, there would appear to be strong evidence of
corporate ows Granger causing retail movements.
Accordingly, a two-equation system for corporate and retail ows is specied.
Based on the VAR results, the error correction term for corporate ows regressed on
retail ows is included in both equations. In each case, a general-to-specic approach
is used, removing any variables in the dynamic specication which are not signicant.
This results in the following system being estimated.
4rt = r (rt 1   0   1ct 1) + 1 4 rt 3 + 2 4 rt 5 + 3 4 ct 2 + 4 4 ct 8 + ut
4ct = c (rt 1   0   1ct 1) + 5 4 ct 1 + t: (1.3)
Coecient estimates are presented in Table 1.9. Note that with this empirical
approach both long-run and short-run coecients are estimated simultaneously. Of
11The lag length of the VAR are determined using standard AIC and SBC criteria.
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particular interest is the coecient on the error correction term in the retail ows
regression - r as this captures the speed of adjustment between the actual and the
long-run level of retail deposits and, therefore, can be interpreted as an estimate of
the stickiness of retail deposit ows. From the estimates, it is clear that r is quite
small. It suggests that if there is a deviation between the actual and the long run
level of retail deposits, only 5 per cent of this deviation would be closed on a daily
basis.
1.6 Conclusions
Availing of a relatively unique high-frequency database on customer deposit ows
within the Central Bank of Ireland, this chapter species a model of weekly corporate
deposit ows. This model is estimated over a period between March 2009 and August
2010 when funding conditions were relatively stable. Drawing on the market disci-
pline literature, deposits are related to measures of bank risk, thereby linking credit
risk and liquidity funding risk. The empirical results show that corporate deposi-
tors are sensitive to measures of banking sector risk, validating the market discipline
hypothesis for the Irish market during the initial phases of the Irish banking crisis.
Contagion across dierent categories of funding markets is also found, as tensions
in the interbank market have explanatory power for corporate deposits during our
sample period.
The empirical relationship between daily corporate and retail ows over the same
period is also examined to investigate if corporate outows are associated with retail
outows. Although retail deposit ows are found to move in the same direction as
corporate deposits, retail deposits appear to exhibit relatively higher inertia up to
August 2010.
While the analysis is conned to the Irish market, it is clear that the results will
be of interest to nancial institutions in an international context. While the recent
nancial crisis may have had particularly severe implications for the Irish banking
sector, it is clear that common trends are now apparent in the underlying vulner-
abilities, particularly, across European nancial institutions. Further, the analysis
shows that any deterioration in the nancial soundness of a deposit-taking entity
will have implications for its deposit-gathering capacity and ability to retain existing
funds, especially in the corporate market. This will be an important consideration
for many European banks seeking to re-orientate their funding structures towards a
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higher reliance on customer deposits and other stable sources of funding in line with
new liquidity requirements under Basel III.
Given that the international banking system continues to face a period of uncer-
tainty in the post-crisis period, it is evident that much more analysis and understand-
ing is required of these sources of institutional funding. While the results presented
here are of general interest, clearly there are a number of fruitful avenues for future
research. These include extending the analysis to incorporate the period after August
2010 and examining the underlying volatility of these deposits.
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1.7 Figures and tables
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Figure 1.1: Index of weekly customer deposits: 23 February 2009 to 6 December 2010.
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Figure 1.2: Long-run corporate deposit model: March 2009 to August 2010
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Note: Data are weekly and expressed in basis points.
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Figure 1.3: Irish bank CDS spreads versus Irish sovereign CDS spreads: February
2009 to August 2010
Actual and Fitted Values
Actual Fitted
%
2009 2010
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Residuals
2009 2010
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
Figure 1.4: Short-run corporate deposit model: March 2009 to August 2010
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Figure 1.6: Performance of corporate deposit model: 16 August 2010 to 20 October
2010
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of daily percentage changes in customer deposits in
Irish banks: 23 February 2009 to 2 December 2010:
Flows Category Obs Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum
Sample: 23/02/2009 - 02/12/2010
Total 452 -0.06 0.48 -1.85 1.90
Corporate 452 -0.16 1.56 -6.84 6.05
Retail 452 -0.02 0.15 -0.64 0.45
Sample: 23/02/2009 - 20/08/2010
Total 378 -0.02 0.49 -1.85 1.90
Corporate 378 -0.04 1.55 -5.84 6.05
Retail 378 0.00 0.14 -0.48 0.32
Sample: 20/08/2010 - 02/12/2010
Total 75 -0.27 0.40 -1.82 0.61
Corporate 75 -0.78 1.45 -6.84 2.38
Retail 75 -0.10 0.18 -0.64 0.45
Note: Sample covers Irish headquartered banks that were active over the period.
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Table 1.3: Long-run model of corporate deposits: 2 March 2009 to 23 August 2010
Dependent variable: ct
OLS FM-OLS
Constant 11.61 11.84
(64.92) (55.52)
spreadt -0.06 -0.06
(-3.48) (-3.20)
aibiratt -0.18 -0.26
(-2.55) (-3.14)
medcdst -0.04 -0.04
(-2.46) (-2.07)
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. FM-OLS refers to Fully Modied OLS and is due to
Philips and Hansen (1990). All variables are in log format and data are weekly frequency.
c is corporate deposits, spread refers to the 3-month Euribor/OIS spread, aibirat refers to
the implied rating for AIB as estimated by Kamakura, medcds refers to the median 5-year
senior CDS spreads for Irish listed banks.
Table 1.4: Controlling for sovereign variables in long-run model of corporate deposits:
2 March 2009 to 23 August 2010
Dependent variable: ct
1 2 3
Constant 11.517 11.097 11.087
(61.95) (153.77) (128.56)
spreadt -0.051 -0.086 -0.090
(-3.10) ( -6.34) (-7.78)
aibiratt -0.157
(-2.27)
medcdst -0.076
( -2.84)
iecdst 0.042 -0.011
(1.65) (-0.65)
iebundspreadt -0.007
(-0.38)
Note:T-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are in log format and data are weekly
frequency. c is corporate deposits, spread refers to the 3-month Euribor/OIS spread, aibirat
refers to the implied rating for AIB as estimated by Kamakura, medcds refers to the median
5-year senior CDS spreads for Irish listed banks. iecds refers to the Irish sovereign 5-year CDS
spreads while iebundspread refers to the dierence between yield on Irish 10-year sovereign
bonds and German 10-year sovereign bonds.
39
Table 1.5: Long- and short-run model of corporate deposits: 2 March 2009 to 23
August 2010
Dependent variable: ct
Constant 11.61
(64.92)
spreadt -0.06
(-3.48)
aibiratt -0.18
(-2.55)
medcdst -0.04
(-2.46)
Dependent variable: 4ct
ecmt 1 -0.34
(-3.99)
4aibiratt 0.02
(0.29)
4aibiratt 1 -0.02
(-0.37)
4spreadt -0.05
(-0.98)
4spreadt 1 -0.00
(-0.00)
4medcdst -0.02
( -0.51)
4medcdst 1 -0.03
( -0.76)
R2 0.17
Note: T-stats are in parentheses. Data are weekly frequency and the Engle-Granger (1987)
two-step approach to error correction modelling is used. c is corporate deposits, spread
refers to the 3-month Euribor/OIS spread, aibirat refers to the implied rating for AIB as
estimated by Kamakura, medcds refers to the median 5-year senior CDS spreads for Irish
listed banks. All variables in the long-run model are in log format, while the short-run model
is in rst dierences. ecm is the error correction term, . The table shows the estimation
results from the following equation,
4ct = 

ct 1   0   1spreadt 1   2aibiratt 1   3medcdst 1

+
pX
i=0
i 4 spreadt i +
pX
i=0
i 4 aibiratt i +
pX
i=0
i 4medcdst i + ut
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Table 1.6: Long- and short-run model of corporate deposits: 2 March 2009 to 23
August 2010
Dependent variable: ct
Constant 11.61
(64.92)
spreadt -0.06
(-3.48)
aibiratt -0.18
(-2.55)
medcdst -0.04
(-2.46)
Dependent variable: 4ct
ecmt 1 -0.36
(-4.27)
R2 0.19
Note: T-stats are in parentheses. Data are weekly frequency and the Engle-Granger(1987)
two-step approach to error correction modelling is used.c is corporate deposits, spread refers
to the 3-month Euribor/OIS spread, aibirat refers to the implied rating for AIB as estimated
by Kamakura, medcds refers to the median 5-year senior CDS spreads for Irish listed banks.
All variables in the long-run model are in log format, while the short-run model is in rst
dierences. ecm is the error correction term , . Statistically insignicant terms have been
dropped from the short-run specication.
Table 1.7: Diagnostic tests on the residuals of short-run model of corporate deposits
Statistic Sig. Level
Ljung-Box Q (1978) Ho: No Autocorrelation
Q(2) 1.93 0.38
Q(4) 2.76 0.60
Q(6) 4.54 0.60
Q(8) 5.29 0.73
Q(10) 7.13 0.71
Q(20) 25.01 0.20
White (1980) Ho:Homoscedasticity
4.12 0.99
Engle (1982) Ho:No ARCH eects
ARCH(4) 0.31 0.99
Jarque-Berra (1987) test for normality
3.21 0.20
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Table 1.8: F-tests from VAR model of retail and corporate ows
F Stat Signicance
4ct 4rt ct rt
4ct 3.414 3.059
(0.00) (0.00)
4rt 1.023 6.018
(0.41) (0.00)
ct 214.66 3.92
(0.00) (0.00)
rt 0.626 457.29
(0.71) (0.00)
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Results of multivariate Granger-Causality Tests on a
VAR(2) with weekly data are shown.
Table 1.9: Long- and short-run retail and corporate deposit model results: 23 Febru-
ary 2009 to 20 August 2010
Coecient Estimate T-Stat
0 10.33 29.83
1 0.142 4.55
r -0.048 -3.08
c 0.539 2.92
1 -0.186 -3.86
2 0.168 3.58
3 0.010 2.36
4 0.010 2.41
5 -0.147 -2.87
Note: T-stats are in parentheses. Both retail and corporate equations estimated simulta-
neously using a VECM and non-linear OLS with the following equations;
4rt = r

rt 1   0   1ct 1

+ 1 4 rt 3 + 2 4 rt 5 + 3 4 ct 2 + 4 4 ct 8 + ut
4ct = c

rt 1   0   1ct 1

+ 5 4 ct 1 + t
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Chapter 2
Investigating the Time-Varying
Volatility of Irish Banks'
Customer Deposits: March 2009
to December 2013
2.1 Introduction
Since the global nancial crisis, there is widespread recognition that reliance on whole-
sale funding and excessive maturity mismatch are not optimal. Liquidity regulation
under Basel III focuses on need for stable and long-term sources of funding to match
banks' long-term assets. Customer deposits are generally considered less risky than
wholesale funding. Therefore, banks have competed aggressively for deposits to meet
future regulatory standards and to try to replace market funding. For banks that ran
into diculty during the crisis and required lender-of-last-resort facilities, deposits
have became their main source of funding. The return of the traditional deposit to
the top of the funding pecking-order increases the need for further research on the em-
pirical properties of this funding source. Furthermore, the scale of the global nancial
crisis and the central role of liquidity/funding risk provides the perfect sample period
from which to draw stylised facts about deposit trends. Such information can help
policy-makers with liquidity stress-testing design and more broadly, increase market
participants understanding of this key funding category.
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This chapter aims to look at the dynamic behaviour of customer deposits in an
advanced economy during a period of systemic nancial stress. In particular, it uses
time-series statistical methods applied to a novel high-frequency database of customer
deposits in Irish owned-banks. The chapter is informed by theoretical models of
bank deposit and funding behaviour during crisis conditions. The data refer to the
period March 2009 to early-2014 and therefore covers most of the recent Irish banking
crisis. The Irish story is of interest given the country's experience with a systemic
banking crisis and associated economic recession during the global nancial crisis,
which resulted in a need for external nancial assistance. By 2012, there were some
emerging macroeconomic signs that the Irish economy was in recovery although at
present, the domestic banking sector is still dealing with legacy issues such as mortgage
arrears. In tandem with solvency issues, the Irish banks also experienced a period of
systemic funding stress. During the crisis, Irish banks lost access to a range of funding
markets, recorded deposit outows and required ocial funding support from the
European Central Bank/Central Bank of Ireland. Therefore, the experience of Irish
banks with customer deposits during the crisis provides a useful statistical sample for
many research questions, especially given the high-frequency nature of the data.
The chapter focuses on deposit volatility, as wide swings in deposit holdings in-
crease renancing risk for banks and introduces uncertainty. Banks may have to hold
more liquid assets to hedge this risk and this higher requirement, in turn, can impact
aggregate lending in the economy if such banks are systemically important. Using a
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) approach due
to Bollerslev (1986), weekly deposit ows are examined to see if they remain stable
over the sample or become more volatile during certain periods. Given that the sample
covers an intense period of nancial stress for the Irish banks there is the possibility
of statistical breaks in the series. Therefore regime switching methods are used to
test if there is change in the time-series behaviour of the data. Using a reduced form
approach, this chapter also investigates the determinants of customer deposits and
tests if customer depositors respond to banking sector risk, sovereign risk or cyclical
factors during a crisis as contended by the deposit/funding literature. Stress in other
funding markets and general risk aversion in nancial markets may also impact cus-
tomer deposits, especially in an interconnected nancial system and where access to
nancial information may be easy. Therefore measures of stress in these markets are
included in the specication to test their statistical signicance.
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Over the sample, weekly customer deposit ows are found to respond to mea-
sures of banking sector and sovereign risk, validating the market discipline hypothe-
sis. Although the data cover resident and non-resident depositors, idiosyncratic and
Irish-specic risk factors seem to have more explanatory power for deposit growth, as
indicators of general stress in international nancial markets are found to be statisti-
cally insignicant. Once market-based risk factors are included in the model, no direct
macro-economic inuence is found. Customer deposit growth rates exhibit autocor-
relation at the weekly frequency. Statistical evidence of a discrete variance regime
shift is found, with deposits switching from a high volatility regime to a low volatility
regime on 8 December 2010 coinciding with the beginning of an European Commis-
sion/European Central Bank (ECB)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Programme
of assistance for Ireland. Uncertainty about Irish banks' nancial health prior to this
date may have contributed to the volatility.
Additionally, the baseline ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1) framework is extended to
test if the volatility of customer deposit ows reacts more to good or bad news. Using
a range of tests, there is no statistical support for an asymmetric response to the sign
of a shock.
The specication is also extended to test if the conditional volatility has explana-
tory power for weekly deposit ows over the week. Interestingly, the volatility of
customer deposits seems to have a negative inuence on deposit ows over the sam-
ple with evidence of a GARCH-in-Mean eect suggesting risk aversion and potential
ight-to-quality concerns. This is a novel empirical application of the GARCH-in-
Mean approach. In standard nance theory, a GARCH-in-Mean approach is justied
by the assumption that investors will demand higher returns for an asset when its
volatility is elevated to compensate for additional risk. The empirical results here
suggest that investors reduce their demand for deposits in the presence of higher
volatility.
Customer deposits comprise both retail and corporate deposits. The latter deposit
type are considered relatively more risky and may exhibit higher volatility. In essence
such deposits may be more like wholesale funding during periods of nancial stress.
The time-varying volatility of both deposit types is examined over the sample using
multivariate GARCH models. Statistical interdependence and causality-in-variance
are also tested. Corporate deposits are found to be more volatile than retail deposits
over the sample. There is, however, evidence of statistical dependence, as the con-
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ditional covariance increases during a period of extreme nancial stress. The weekly
changes in both categories are positively correlated over the sample and there is ev-
idence that there are volatility spill-overs from corporate to retail deposits. These
ndings indicate that although retail deposits are generally more stable than corpo-
rate, both deposit types will become more volatile and unreliable during a period of
nancial stress. Therefore there are no diversication benets during nancial crises.
This chapter draws on and contributes to the literature on deposit or funding
dynamics during a nancial crisis. Although the global nancial crisis renewed in-
terest in economic research on funding matters, there is of course, a long tradition
of studies on banking crises and in particular, on bank runs and possible contagion.
Some key papers are Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (1998) which
focuses on the risk of bank runs in a representative bank setting, while others such
as Diamond and Rajan (2005) and Allen and Gale (2004) consider the possibility
of contagion among banks arising from liquidity shortages. Other papers test the
ability of depositors to distinguish between healthy and weak banks during a crisis,
drawing on the theoretical links between demandable debt (e.g., deposits) and market
discipline in Calomiris and Kahn (1991). Some examples are Goldberg and Hudgins
(1996) who examine the experience of Savings and Loan Associations with uninsured
deposits during the late-1980s in the United States (US), Hori, Ito and Murata, (2009)
who nd evidence of market discipline among depositors during the Japanese crisis
and Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) who examine the sensitivity of depositors at both
European and US banks to bank-specic risk prior to 2007.
Bank runs during the global nancial crisis did not just depend on the bank/depositor
relationship as wholesale funding played a signicant role. Shin (2009) draws on 2007
Northern Rock episode and highlights that the initial phases of recent bank runs are
driven by non-retail and market sources of funding due to aggregate risk aversion and
binding external constraints on these funding providers' own nancial positions. Re-
tail depositors then run, once funding pressures become acute and visible at the bank.
Research on funding issues have also expanded since the crisis with papers exploring
the links between the market liquidity and funding (e.g., Drehman and Nikolaou,
2013). Recent papers also focus on the close correlation between funding risk and
credit risk/solvency risk (Borio, 2010) and sovereign risk (CGFS, 2011).
In the Irish market, there have been a number of papers looking at deposit or
funding dynamics in recent times. Chapter one focuses on modelling weekly corporate
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deposits in Irish banks over the period March 2009 to August 2010 using the same
database as the current chapter. Kelly et al., (2014) looks at household deposits and
test if Irish households respond to changes in deposit rates across the Irish banks
over the period 2003Q1 to 2013Q2 using panel data techniques while Lane (2015)
discusses changes in funding categories of the Irish banking system over the period
2003 through 2008 highlighting the importance of non-euro funding and foreign oces
of Irish banks.
To the author's knowledge, however, this is the rst study to investigate the time-
series behaviour of customer deposits through the Irish crisis and up to end-2013 on
a high-frequency basis. This chapter also explicitly models the time-varying volatility
over the sample. A deeper understanding of the time-varying volatility of this key
funding category is important from a nancial stability risk perspective and allows
for more ecient estimation and forecasting.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the dataset and
presents some preliminary data analysis while Section 2.3 species and estimates
an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (1,1) - GARCH (1,1) model of weekly customer
deposit ows. Section 2.4 test some additional enhancements to the basic model such
as investigating possible regime shifts, testing the signicance of asymmetric terms
in the GARCH specication and including GARCH-in-Mean eects. Section 2.5 in-
vestigates the statistical dependence between retail and corporate deposits over the
sample while Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Customer deposit data
The research benets from access to a unique, internal database of daily net funding
ows created in the Central Bank of Ireland to monitor funding developments in the
Irish banks during the crisis. A net ow is the dierence between the inows and
outows across funding categories as at close of business each day. The liabilities
data are consolidated. This research focuses on the customer deposit component on
this database. The term customer deposits covers both retail or household deposits
and corporate or rm deposits. Recall that chapter one also draws on this dataset
but focuses on the period March 2009 to late-2010. The data used in this chapter
refer to the period March 2009 through February 2014. In terms of estimation, the
2014 data are excluded so that out-of-sample performance can be evaluated.
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Customer deposit data aggregated at a system level are used. The Irish bank
sample covers the banks headquartered in Ireland and active over this period such as
Allied Irish Banks plc, The Governor and the Bank of Ireland, Educational Building
Society, Irish Life and Permanent plc/permanent tsb, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
and Irish Nationwide Building Society. Over the sample period, the Irish banking
sector underwent signicant restructuring in response to the domestic crisis. Delev-
ering, mergers and a liquidation meant that the above sample of six was reduced to
three during the sample.
Prior to estimation, a deposit levels series is created from the net ows using
outstanding deposits as at December 2013. In particular, by adjusting the outstanding
amounts with the daily net customer deposit ows over the sample a daily deposit
series is created. To minimise potential noise from daily transactions, weekly data
are used. Wednesday data are used in this analysis to remove any potential days-of-
the-week eects and to reduce loss of observations due to bank holidays.1 Figure 2.1
shows the weekly percentage change in customer deposits over the period March 2009
through December 2013. Weekly percentage changes are calculated as follows,
4dt = 100  [ln(dt)  ln(dt 1)] (2.1)
where ln is the natural logarithm and d are weekly customer deposits. The large
swings in the weekly percentage changes in deposits up to late-2010 compared with the
rest of the sample are clearly evident. The largest weekly decline was in late-November
2010 at 4.1 per cent just prior to the EU/ECB/IMF program of external assistance
for Ireland (See Table 2.1). The gures appear to remain negative until Summer 2011
which would have coincided with the renegotiation of debt terms between Ireland and
its external creditors under the Programme and the receipt of private investment for
one the main Irish banks (e.g., Bank of Ireland). Such developments may have had a
positive impact on deposit ows.
Looking a little closer at the data, the average growth rate over the sample was
-0.12 per cent per week. Table 2.1 shows evidence of non-normality. Relative to the
normal distribution, the data are suggestive of a more fat-tailed distribution, with the
negative skewness result indicating that the distribution is skewed to the left. As we
can see from the associated density function in Figure 2.2 there are a number of large
negative outliers. Given that the sample period includes the recent systemic banking
1Any remaining missing values are interpolated.
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crisis in Ireland, this result is not surprising.
As noted, this chapter is interested in the volatility of customer deposits. As a
preliminary examination of this issue, standard statistical measures of time-varying
volatility are shown in Figure 2.3. In addition to a rolling average estimate of volatility,
an exponentially weighted average is used which places less weight on the distant
past. A one-year window is used so 2009 is excluded from the gure. As can be seen,
the volatility spikes around late-2010 and then reduces. This initial examination
suggests that volatility may not be constant over the period. There appears to be two
distinct phases which is conrmed by the regime switching analysis in Section 2.4.1.
The period before 2011 appears to be one of heightened volatility while the period
thereafter was relatively tranquil.
2.3 Modelling customer deposits
This analysis uses a Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH)
framework to capture the time-varying volatility of the customer deposit series. Both
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (Engle, 1982) and GARCH (Bollerslev,
1986) models can capture periods of turbulence and relative calm within a data se-
ries. With this approach both the conditional mean and the conditional variance of
weekly deposit changes will be estimated simultaneously using Maximum Likelihood
and the following system of equations,
4dt = 4xt + t; (2.2)
t =
p
htvt; vt  N(0; 1) (2.3)
ht = 0 +
qX
i=1
i
2
t i +
pX
j=1
jht j (2.4)
Here 4dt is the weekly percentage change in customer deposits and 4xt is our
vector of possible explanatory variables, which are discussed in subsection 2.3.2.
GARCH-in-Mean eects are also tested in subsection 2.4.4. t is the random er-
ror term while ht is the conditional variance of t and vt is standardised white noise
with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. ,  and  are parameters to be estimated2.
2These models estimate the variance recursively so pre-sample GARCH parameters need to be
specied. The econometric software package RATS uses the unconditional estimates of both the
lagged squared residuals and the lagged variance from the mean model estimates for these pre-
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The variables p and q determine the order of the GARCH specication. For example,
if p is equal to 0 and q equal to 1, a GARCH (0,1) model is used. The values of p and
q are determined by information criteria or by comparing the t of the model. To
ensure stability of the GARCH process, the sum of 1 and 1 in equation 2.4 must
be less than one. Also all of the parameters in the GARCH specication must be
positive to ensure a positive conditional variance.
2.3.1 Literature on deposit dynamics during a nancial crisis
The rst step in GARCH modeling is to determine an appropriate model of deposit
ows (i.e., specify the conditional mean). As a guide to potential determinants of
customer deposits over this period, the literature on deposits dynamics during a crisis
is useful, in addition to Irish market developments.
In normal or non-crisis periods, deposits changes may by driven by cyclical factors
and a range of microeconomic or deposit characteristics such as term, origin, price, in-
sured versus insured. During crises however, there are range of competing theories for
deposit movements. Most of these papers are concerned with explaining withdrawal
risk. The seminal theoretical bank run paper is Diamond and Dybvig (1983) which
shows that in a representative bank setting, bank runs can be self-fullling events in
the context of a rst come, rst served assumption and an illiquid investment asset.
Bank runs are one possible outcome in this multiple equilbria setting. The literature
then divides on what factors can trigger this outcome.
Earlier papers say that depositor panic and related withdrawals can be due to
mass hysteria and random events (Kindleberger, 1978) while other papers link deposit
outows to changes in the business cycle and depositors' change in perceptions about
future bank fundamentals (Gorton, 1988 and Allen and Gale, 1998). In the latter
literature, depositors lack bank-specic information and so derive a risk assessment
from aggregate information about economic activity. Emerging signs of a recession
increases the likelihood that future bank returns will drop. To protect their future
consumption, depositors will remove their savings in advance. As depositors cannot
distinguish between banks, a number of banks in an economy will be aected. Gorton
contends that depositor behaviour is the same in both crisis and normal times. It is
sample values (See Estima, 2012 and Doan, 2013). These assumptions are, therefore, used in this
chapter.
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the cumulative impact of many indicators about an impending recession which leads
to depositor panic.
Assuming a sequential service constraint as in Diamond and Dyvbig (1983), Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) show that costly deposit contracts can also discipline banks. In this
context, depositors or other types of demandable debt have an incentive to monitor
banks and will run on the bank if its fundamentals deteriorate. There is a large
body of research that contend that depositors or other holders of demandable bank
debt could distinguish between healthy and weak banks. Therefore deposits or other
sources of funding would respond negatively to increased risk on banks' balance sheets
and/or such banks would need to oer higher rates of return to retain the funding. In
essence such short-term funding categories could help to discipline bank's risk-taking
behaviour. This market discipline hypothesis and related empirical literature are in-
troduced in chapter one, (section 1.3). An example of an early market discipline paper
is Hannen and Hanweck (1988) who examine the US market for large uninsured cer-
ticates of deposit (CD) and found evidence that interest rate spreads on certain CD
maturities were sensitive to various measure of insolvency risk in 1985. The authors
nd that indicators of bank risk such as the standard deviation of return on assets,
measures of the probability of insolvency and the capital-asset ratio all impact rates
on jumbo CDs consistent with the market discipline hypothesis.
As noted in chapter one, Hori, Ito and Murata (2009) use a large panel of deposit-
taking institutions in Japan over the period 1992 to 2002 to examine if depositors are
able to distinguish between healthy and risky institutions during the Japanese crisis.
In terms of methodology, this paper looks at the impact of bank-level indicators of
risk on both deposit growth and deposit interest rates. To overcome simultaneity
problems of supply /demand equations, reduced form specications for both deposit
growth and interest rates are estimated. Fundamental variables include the capital-
asset ratio and bank protability (i.e., the ratio of operational prots to total assets).
They nd evidence in favour of the market discipline hypothesis.
Many of the aforementioned factors relate to supply-side shocks for the banks.
During a period of nancial stress, a reduction in deposits could be also be due to
demand-side shocks, in that depositors may need to draw down savings to smooth
consumption or pay down debts. There is clearly evidence of such eects in the Irish
crisis with declines in the personal saving rate being partly explained by household
debt consolidation. (Cussen et al., 2012). Chari and Jagannathan (1988) show that
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bank runs can also occur even in the absence of specic bad news about a bank's
nancial position. Certain uninformed depositors will base their actions on the actions
of other depositors. If a run is observed outside a bank or if many depositors withdraw
funds to meet their own liquidity requirements, both cases may lead the uninformed
depositors to run on the bank.
Based on the literature, specic triggers for such bank runs are asymmetric infor-
mation on the probability of bank default risk, coordination failure among depositors
or information cascades among dierent classes of depositors. Liquidity risk can also
be contagious. Papers that deal with systemic liquidity risk are Allen and Gale (2004),
Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005) and Diamond and Rajan (2005).
As a result of the global nancial crisis (GFC), research on bank funding risk has
grown and in particular, on the possible correlation between funding risk and other
risks faced by credit institutions during a period of nancial stress. Specically, papers
have addressed the negative relationship between funding and market liquidity (e.g.,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, Drehman and Nikolaou, 2013), the close correlation
between funding and solvency risk or credit risk (Borio, 2010) and of course, the GFC
showed that the negative bank/sovereign nexus aected the banks mainly through
the funding channel (CGFS, 2011).
In the Irish market, there have been a number of papers looking at deposit or
funding dynamics in recent times. Chapter one uses the same database and focuses
on modelling weekly corporate deposits in Irish banks over the period March 2009 to
August 2010 . The relationship between retail and corporate deposit levels over this
period is also examined in the previous chapter. Specically, the chapter tests the
responsiveness of weekly corporate deposits to changes in measures of bank soundness
such as CDS spreads and implied ratings and to changes in funding market conditions.
The study nds evidence of market discipline among corporate depositors as deposits
responds negatively to a deterioration in banks' perceived creditworthiness. Adverse
developments in international funding markets are also shown to have a negative
impact on Irish banks' corporate deposits. In terms of retail versus corporate, the
chapter nds that retail deposits were relatively more sticky than corporate deposits
over the period using an error correction framework.
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2.3.2 Specifying a model of Irish customer deposit growth
Drawing on the deposit literature weekly changes in Irish customer deposits are hy-
pothesised to be inuenced by movements in measures of bank risk, sovereign risk,
domestic cyclical factors and general stress in nancial markets. The presence of
substitution eects with other nancial assets is also tested. A simple Autoregressive
Distributed Lag (ARDL) time-series model is used which includes lagged values of
the explanatory variables and lagged values of the dependent variable to capture per-
sistence. In this reduced form model, each of the estimated coecients represent the
marginal eect of the respective variable on the dependent variable, holding the other
variables constant. Unit root testing nds evidence that the variables of interest in
rst dierences are dierence stationary and integrated of order 0 (See Appendix 1
for further details). Equation 2.5 is our baseline specication.
4dt = 0 +
mX
i=1
i4dt i +
nX
i=1
i4xt i + t (2.5)
where 4dt is the weekly percentage change in deposits and xt is a vector of the
following possible explanatory variables;
 Weekly percentage change in the Irish banking sector's share price (4Bksp),
 Weekly percentage change in the Irish sovereign's senior Credit Default Swap
spread (CDS), (4IEcds),
 Weekly percentage change in the value of Irish equity prices (4ISEQgen),
 Weekly percentage change in a measure of general market stress across European
nancial markets (4CISS),
 Weekly percentage change in a measure of stress in European money markets,
(4MMspread),
 Weekly percentage change in Irish consumer sentiment index (4CONsent) .
A bank's share price is considered a good measure of the market's perception of its
nancial soundness and so proxies for bank-specic risk in our specication. A simple
average of the share prices of the Irish banks that were listed over the sample period
is used. If the market discipline hypothesis holds, a positive relationship between
4Bksp and our dependent variable is expected.
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During a crisis, if a systemic bank runs into diculty, investors may link the credit
risk of the sovereign to that of the troubled bank if there is an explicit or indeed im-
plicit state guarantee in place. In September 2008, the Irish Government introduced
a wide guarantee on the domestic banks' liabilities in an attempt to alleviate funding
pressures. Such a guarantee created a contingent liability for the Irish State. As
the Irish crisis unfolded, national authorities maintained a State guarantee on bank
liabilities, albeit with dierent scope and coverage and also provided capital to the
domestic banks. Such actual and contingent liabilities for the State link bank fund-
ing risk and sovereign creditworthiness. Sovereign CDS spreads provide a possible
measure of the market's perception of the degree of counter-party credit risk posed
by the respective state. In this chapter, Euro senior 5-year CDS spreads for the Irish
Government are used to control for Irish sovereign risk. As with bank share prices, it
is expected that customer deposits will vary inversely with changes in sovereign risk.
3
A measure of the value of alternative Irish nancial assets is also included to
capture possible substitution eects by household and rms. In particular, the value
of the ISEQ General Index which covers all non-nancial rms listed on the Irish stock
exchange is used. Depositors may decide to move their savings into such investments
to gain a relatively higher return or in a ight-to-safer assets, particularly during a
banking crisis.
A measure of stress in international nancial markets is included. Drawing on
chapter one which nds that corporate deposits in Irish banks are negatively related
to increased tensions in European money markets, the spread between the 3-month
Euribor rate and the Overnight Indexed Swap rate is used , 4MMspread. A gen-
eral nancial stress index for European nancial markets developed by economists at
the European Central Bank called the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress or
CISS for short (see Hollo et al., 2012 for further details) is also tested to see if it has
explanatory power for customer deposits in Irish banks. The CISS indicator is gener-
ally considered useful as a coincident measure of systemic nancial stress facilitating
real-time monitoring of systemic risk. This indicator tracks stress across the nancial
system while also controlling for each market's time-varying cross-correlations.
3In some of the market discipline literature it is contended that the presence of deposit insurance
reduces the incentives for depositors to monitor the nancial soundness of banks. Therefore, market
disciplining eects may not hold. This eect cannot be tested here due to both the comprehensive
nature of the Irish guarantees during the crisis on customer deposits and insucient granularity to
distinguish between insured and non-insured deposits over the sample.
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All of the market-based data are sourced from Thomsen Reuters/Datastream with
daily observations compacted to weekly frequency. As with the deposit data, where
possible, Wednesday on Wednesday data are used.
To control for cyclical factors and aggregate risk, high-frequency leading indica-
tors of Irish economic activity are required. The monthly Irish consumer sentiment
index sourced from the European Commission/Eurostat is interpolated before being
included in the general specication. The nature of the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and deposits can be complex. In an economic upswing, depositors
may decide to increase precautionary savings so that consumption can be smoothed
over the cycle. Additionally bank protability may be positively related to favorable
macroeconomic conditions, particularly in countries where banks derive most of their
income. Consequently, banks can choose to increase their deposit interest rates to
attract and retain customer deposits. As such banks are more nancial sound, depos-
itors may also be more condent about holding their savings there. Such dynamics
may operate in reverse in a recession. In this case a positive relationship is expected
between deposit growth and economic activity.
However, it may be possible that deposits holdings could decrease during a period
of economic growth, especially when banks can easily substitute deposits for cheaper
sources of market-based funding. Deposit rates may, therefore, be relatively lower
than the returns that could be achieved on other types of nancial and non-nancial
assets by households and rms. A further issue is that rates oered by banks on
both loans and deposits generally track the policy rate if the monetary transmission
mechanism is fully operational in a currency area. So if the prevailing monetary
policy stance is accommodative, deposit rates may not be high enough to attract new
deposits. Prior to the global nancial crisis, interest rates were historically low and
certain banks relied on non-deposit sources of funding to increase their assets. Such
eects may have a dampening eect on deposits and may in turn, oset the positive
eects of higher economic growth.
2.3.3 ARDL (1,1) results
In this chapter, both m and n in (2.5) are one so we have an ARDL (1,1) speci-
cation. A general-to-specic approach is used to determine the most parsimonious
specication of weekly percentage change in deposits. The results are shown in Table
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2.2. This is the initial model as the nal model will be obtained when both the con-
ditional mean and the conditional variance are estimated together. In column (1), all
explanatory variables are included with the exception of 4CISS and 4MMspread,
which are included separately in (1) and (2) respectively, as both variables control for
similar eects.
Neither of the market measures of risk are signicant. In columns (3) and (4)
the least signicant variable are dropped sequentially. So in this case, the coecients
on the weekly percentage changes in the Irish consumer sentiment index and on the
money market spread are insignicant. The regression results in (4) show that our
variables have the expected signs and are signicant at conventional level. Customer
deposit ows in Irish banks over the period 2009 through 2013 appear to react to
changes in both measures of bank-specic and sovereign risk. There is also some
evidence of persistence in the deposit data and substitution eects appear to be in
operation. The coecient on the lagged dependent variable is less than one so the
process is convergent. But surprisingly the results show no signicant macro-economic
eects. It may be possible that the eects of the high-frequency market data reduces
the eects of the interpolated economic indicator.
Standard misspecication testing on the residuals shows no evidence of serial corre-
lation using the Ljung-Box (1978) Q (4) statistic. Engle's (1982) Lagrange multiplier
test points to ARCH eects in the squared residuals indicating serial dependence and
some clustering of large residuals. The R2 is low at 10 per cent, although not un-
common with modelling weekly percentage changes. As can be seen in Figure 2.4 the
presence of some larger residuals, particularly before 2011 suggests that other factors
outside of our specication such as aggregate uncertainty or negative sentiment may
also be playing a role in explaining customer deposits over the period.
To check stability of the initial coecient estimates over the sample, recursive least
squares estimation is used. Figure 2.5 shows that after the initial burn-in period, the
estimates are relatively stable although the lagged dependent variable does appear
to change sign early in the regressions. Although the time-varying volatility will
be explicitly modelled in Section 2.3.4, Eicker-White Standard Errors are used to
ensure consistent parameter estimates for the ARDL(1,1) specication. The results
are shown in column (5) in Table 2.2. All of coecients remain signicant although
the lagged dependent variable is just signicant at the 10 per cent level.
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Although the weekly deposit data are not public until the banks publish consol-
idated nancial information, which is usually at a lower frequency, reverse causality
could be an issue. Potential endogeneity between deposit growth and the explana-
tory variables is tested using a multivariate version of Granger (1969) causality tests.
First, a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) equation with the lag length determined by
the Akaike Information Criterion is estimated. Two lags are deemed optimal. The
p-values from the associated F tests are shown in Table 2.3. The null hypothesis is
that lagged values of the explanatory variables do not have predictive power for the
respective dependent variable in each equation of the VAR. Based on the rst row
of the table, there no statistical evidence that lags of dt Granger causes the other
variables. This result justies our single equation approach. Interestingly, lagged
values of the weekly changes in the ISEQ general index do not appear to provide a
good forecast for customer deposit growth. Indeed, this variable becomes statistically
insignicant when the conditional mean and the conditional variance are estimated
together in the GARCH framework in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.4 Controlling for GARCH (1,1) eects
Table 2.4 shows the results of our GARCH model which is estimated over the period
11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014 (i.e., 252 observations). Assuming normal errors,
Maximum Likelihood estimation is used. Having also tried a number of low order
ARCH and GARCH models 4, a GARCH(1,1) was a good t for the conditional
variance of the residuals of the ARDL (1,1) model based on a comparison of log
likelihood functions and information criteria (See Appendix 2 for details). Turning
to the conditional variance equation for ht, we can see that the GARCH coecients
are all positive, statistically signicant and the sum of 1 and 1 is less than one
implying a mean-reverting/stationary process. As the sum of the coecients on 1
and 1 coecients is close to unity, this implies that any shocks to the conditional
variance will be persistent for a time.
The ARCH parameter, 1 (i.e., coecient on the lagged squared residuals) is much
less that the GARCH parameter (1) indicating that the volatility of weekly deposits
respond more to its own lagged values than to news. On the mean model, only the co-
ecients on our lagged dependent variable, 4dt 1 and bank share price (4BKspt 1)
are signicant at the 5 per cent level. The point estimate of our coecient on Irish
4Generally, low order GARCH models are found to work well in empirical studies.
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sovereign CDS spread is statistical signicant at the 10 per cent level.
Figure 2.6 shows the standardised residuals. These are the residuals divided by
their conditional standard deviation. If the mean model is correctly specied, the
standardised residuals should approximate white noise and have no remaining serial
correlation as they are an estimate of vt in Equation (2.3). The Ljung-Box (1978) Q
statistic shows that under the 5 per cent signicance level, the standardised residuals
are not serially correlated up to order 4. There is some evidence of higher-order serial
correlation in the residuals. The Jarque-Berra (1987) test indicates non-normality in
the standardised residuals in Table 2.4.
In order to determine if our GARCH process is sucient to capture all of the
dynamics of the conditional variance, the autocorrelations of the squared standardised
residuals are examined. The autocorrelation function and the McLeod-Li (1983) test
(i.e., a modied version of the Ljung-Box (Q) statistic) shows no evidence of remaining
GARCH eects in the squared standardised residuals (see Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4).
2.4 Enhancements to baseline ARDL (1,1) - GARCH
(1,1) model
2.4.1 Stability of the conditional variance and testing for pos-
sible regime shifts
The tted values for the conditional variance in Figure 2.7 raise concerns about the
stability of the series over the sample period. The conditional variance appears to
have relatively large values prior to 2011. The simple statistical measures of volatility
in Section 2.2 also suggested the possibility of a change in the dynamic behaviour of
deposit volatility over our sample. Further, as we saw in Table 2.4 the sum of 1 and
1 is close to one signaling persistence in the conditional volatility of customer deposit
ows. Hillebrand (2005) shows that an unmodelled statistical break can cause highly
persistent conditional volatility.
Rather than arbitrarily choosing a break date, regime switching methods are used
to detect possible break points in the variance of the error term. Specically, the vari-
ance of the error term, t in Equation 2.6 is tested to see if it switches over the sample
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using a rst-order Markov process and assuming constant transition probabilities (See
Appendix 3 for further details).
4dt = 0 + 14dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + 4ISEQgent 1 + i;t (2.6)
where
i;t  N(0; 2i ); i = 1; 2
As can be seen from the estimated smoothed probabilities in Figure 2.8, two
distinct regimes emerge. A high volatility period up to end-November 2010 with a
low volatility period beginning in early-December 2010 and prevailing until the end
of the sample.
A variance shift dummy, Dt is therefore included in the conditional variance spec-
ication before re-estimating the GARCH (1,1) - ARDL model. In particular, the
binary variable takes a value of 1 from 11 March 2009 up to 8 December 2010 and
0 thereafter. To correct the standard errors for any eects of the non-normal stan-
dardised residuals on the likelihood function, quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) is
implemented. Furthermore, any insignicant variables are subsequently omitted to
obtain a parsimonious specication for 4dt. The revised specication for customer
deposits is given by the following ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1) system of equations,
4dt = 14dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + t (2.7)
t =
p
htvt; vt  N(0; 1) (2.8)
ht = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 1ht 1 + Dt (2.9)
Table 2.5 shows the results. The intercept in the variance equation now captures
the mean variance after the break-date while the coecient on our dummy variable
shows the increase in the average variance before 8 December 2010. The volatility
prior to 8 December 2010 is higher by a factor of about 8. This result indicates
that customer deposits in Irish banks became less variable after Ireland entered a
Programme of external assistance on 28 November 2010. Greater movement in deposit
ows prior to the Programme may reect investor uncertainty about the default risk
posed by Irish banks up to that date. The GARCH parameters remain statistically
signicant and as expected, the persistence reduces signicantly once we control for
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the statistical break. The estimated conditional variance controlling for the break
point is compared to the estimated variance from the Markov switching regression in
Figure 2.9.
2.4.2 Out-of-sample evaluation of ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1)
model
In the previous subsection, we saw that an ARDL (1,1) with GARCH (1,1) errors
had a satisfactory in-sample t. The model's out-of-sample performance is also tested
using actual data for early-2014. Specically, an 8-step dynamic forecast is conducted
using the mean model specication. The conditional standard deviation is used to
construct a two standard error condence interval. Figure 2.10 compares the actual
weekly percentage change in customer deposits with the forecasts over the forecast
horizon, namely 8 January 2014 to 26 February 2014. The model seems to capture
the general trend although it does not fully reect the scale of the decline on the fth
week.
2.4.3 Other GARCH specications - asymmetries
In Section 2.3.4 a simple GARCH (1,1) explains the conditional volatility of customer
deposits relatively well. This subsection investigates if other variants of the GARCH
model are useful in describing the data. Specically, the statistical signicance of
asymmetric terms is examined.
In equity markets, negative shocks or bad news appear to exert a greater eect
on the volatility of price returns than positive shocks. It is contended that leverage
eects may be at play in this instance. The standard GARCH specication makes no
allowance for this possibility as the squared residuals are used. To initially investigate
if customer deposits respond asymmetrically to dierent types of news, a simple test
based on Enders (2010) is employed. The squared standardised residuals from our
Equations 2.7 and 2.9 are regressed on a constant and lags of the standardised residu-
als. If there are leverage eects, the squared standardised residuals will be correlated
with the levels of the standardised residuals. The results from this regression and the
associated F test are shown in Appendix 4. As can be seen, the null that coecients
are equal to zero cannot be rejected. This specic test provides no evidence of leverage
eects in the weekly customer deposit data.
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An additional method of testing for asymmetric eects involves the inclusion of
an asymmetric term in the conditional variance equation and evaluating its statis-
tical signicance. This asymmetric response can be modelled with an exponential
GARCH (E-GARCH) specication due to Nelson (1991) or with a Threshold GARCH
(TARCH) specication due to Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993). Both ap-
proaches are applied to the data. The results are contained in Appendix 4. As can
be seen, the asymmetric terms are not found to be statistically signicant in either
case. Therefore we can conclude that the sign of innovations does not matter to the
volatility of customer deposits.
2.4.4 GARCH-in-Mean eects
It may also be possible that the conditional variance has some explanatory power for
the weekly change in customer deposits. The inclusion of the conditional variance
ht in the mean model is called a GARCH-in-Mean specication (GARCH-M). This
approach is often applied to asset markets, where it is assumed that risk averse buyers
demand a risk premium to compensate for the risk of holding the asset, as proxied
by the conditional variance. Excess returns may therefore be positively related to
the conditional volatility of the returns (See Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) for an
example of an ARCH-M model).
Although the GARCH-M approach may be more applicable in markets where
prices are freely observable, a relationship between weekly customer deposit growth
and the riskiness of these savings as proxied by the conditional variance may exist.
Large swings in customer deposits increase renancing risk for banks. During a period
of systemic nancial stress, funding may be tight and any signicant shortfall between
inows and outows may create challenges for banks in meeting their funding commit-
ments as they fall due. In subsection 2.3.3, no evidence of reverse causality between
deposit growth and the various measures of counterparty credit risk. Certain large
depositors or institutional depositors who actively manage their investments may be
able to infer the inherent riskiness of Irish banks over the sample using a range of
other publicly available nancial data outside of our current explanatory variables
such as rating agency reports.
Therefore, our conditional mean equation is respecied to include ht which is
estimated as in Equation 2.9. The new specication for dt is given by Equation 2.10.
If the conditional variance proxies for the riskiness associated with deposits in Irish
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banks over the sample, there should be a negative relationship between ht and dt.
The GARCH-M(1,1) - ARDL(1,1) model is estimated using QMLE. Table 2.6 displays
the results. The contemporaneous conditional variance is found to have explanatory
power for weekly percentage changes in customer deposits. The estimated coecient
is negative, implying that an increase in volatility of customer deposits leads to a
decrease in customer deposits within the week. Specically a 1 per cent increase in
the conditional volatility of customer deposit ows is found to decrease deposit growth
by 0.3 per cent on a weekly basis. There is some improvement in model t as the log
likelihood increases. The GARCH term 1 drops slightly in signicance but remains
well within the 10 per cent signicance level.
4dt = 0 + 14dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + ht + t (2.10)
2.5 Corporate versus retail deposits and multivariate
GARCH models
Customer deposits refer to both retail and corporate deposits. In this section, the
data are disaggregated by deposit type and the time-varying volatility of each series is
modelled. Multivariate GARCH techniques are used as it is likely that both types of
deposits are subject to certain common shocks, which may aect the volatility of the
weekly ows in each category. Also, by estimating the conditional variance of retail
and corporate deposits and their conditional covariance simultaneously, statistical
interdependence over the sample can be tested in addition to deposit-specic volatility.
The issue of correlation is also addressed.
2.5.1 Preliminary statistical analysis
Figure 2.11 shows the contribution of retail and corporate deposits to the weekly
growth rates of aggregate customer deposits over the sample March 2009 to end-2013.
The wide swings in weekly growth rates prior to the regime shift in early-December
2010 appears to be driven by corporate deposits with retail deposits contributing more
to the weekly changes after the break point. This pre-2010 trend is conrmed when
we look at the individual weekly growth rates in Figure 2.12. Over the sample retail
deposits account for the majority of customer deposits at 78 per cent. Up to end-
November 2010, the retail deposit share averaged 70 per cent before increasing to an
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average share of 83 per cent for the remainder of the sample due to relatively higher
falls in corporate deposits. Even with the higher weighting for retail, the signicant
swings in corporate deposits up to late-2010 appear to drive the aggregate series.
Table 2.7 looks at the summary statistics for each deposit type over the sample.
On average, retail records a weekly decline of just 0.04 per cent compared to 0.3 per
cent for corporate deposits. The greatest decline for both deposit categories is in
November 2010. Corporate deposits fall by 12 per cent per week while retail deposits
fall by 2 per cent. In terms of inows the maximum increase is signicantly higher
for corporate deposits. The sample standard deviation is also 6.6 times higher for
corporate deposits. For both categories, the skewness coecient suggests that weekly
ow distribution is negatively skewed and the Kurtosis coecient suggests that the
tails of the distribution are thicker than those of a standard normal. Such evidence of
non-normality is conrmed by signicance of the Jarque-Berra (1987) test statistic,
leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of normally distributed deposit changes.
2.5.2 BEKK model and testing for volatility spill-overs
To test for volatility spill-overs between retail and corporate deposits, a bivariate
BEKK model is used. This approach was made popular by Engle and Kroner (1995).
To ensure a positive denite variance-covariance matrix, certain restrictions are im-
posed. Specically all parameters enter the model in quadratic form. The interest in
this section is on the conditional variance of each series rather than explaining the
deposit ows. Therefore, a constant conditional mean for both retail (4rt) and cor-
porate (4ct) deposit ows is assumed. To estimate the BEKK model, the following
system of equations is used,
4ct = + 1t (2.11)
4rt =  + 2t (2.12)
1t = v1t
p
h11t (2.13)
2t = v2t
p
h22t (2.14)
itj
t 1  (0; Ht); i = 1; 2 (2.15)
Ht = CC
0 +A0t 10t 1A+B
0Ht 1B (2.16)
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where in our two variable case,
Ht =
0B@h11t h12t
h21t h22t
1CA ; C =
0B@c11 c12
c21 c22
1CA ; A =
0B@a11 a12
a21 a22
1CA ; B =
0B@b11 b12
b21 b22
1CA
h11 and h22 are the conditional variance of the weekly percentage changes in corporate
(4ct) and retail (4rt) deposits respectively. h12 or h21 is the conditional covariance
between two shocks. Ht, the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, depends on
the squared residuals, cross-products of the residuals and the conditional variances and
covariances of the two variables in the system. The 2 by 2 matrix A shows the ARCH
eects while the 2 by 2 matrix B covers the GARCH eects and the variance intercept
matrix C is lower triangular. The diagonal elements in B show the eects of lagged
volatility, with the cross-deposit eects contained in the o-diagonals. Similarly, the
o-diagonals in the A matrix shows the bilateral impact of news or shocks to one
deposit type on the variance of the other deposit type. Therefore, drawing on a Wald
test proposed by Hafner and Herwartz (2004), it is possible to test the direction of
variance causality between retail and corporate deposits. Specically the following
hypotheses are tested:
 if there is variance causality from corporate to retail a12t & b12t should be jointly
statistically signicant,
 if there is variance causality from retail to corporate,a21t & b21t should be jointly
statistically signicant.
In both cases a Wald Test with a 2 test statistic and 2 degrees of freedom may
be used. The estimation results are contained in Table 2.8. The simple test for
causality suggest that the direction of variance causality may run from corporate to
retail but not in reverse. For both categories of deposits the own-eects are signicant.
The multivariate Q statistic5 on the stardardised squared residuals shows no residual
ARCH eects. Figure 2.13 presents the tted values for the conditional variances
and the conditional covariance. Based on the conditional variances, it is clear that
corporate deposits are much more volatile than retail deposits. The variance of both
series spikes in late-2010 and there is an increase in the conditional covariance at this
time.
5See pp. 83-85 in Doan (2013) for further details.
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2.5.3 Correlation and CCC model
To further investigate statistical comovement between the two series, the analysis in
this subsection focuses on correlation. Based on a 24-week rolling average correlation
coecient in Figure 2.14, weekly retail and corporate appear to be positively corre-
lated for a period between mid-2010 to early-2011. To formally test if both series were
correlated over the sample, a Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) multivariate
GARCH model due to (Bollerslev, 1990) is used 6. The conditional mean equations
are as in Equations 2.11 and 2.12 and it is assumed that the residual series () for both
retail and corporate deposits can be estimated as a GARCH(1,1) process. Therefore
with the subscript 1 referring to corporate and the 2 retail, the following equations
are used,
h11t = c10 + a1
2
1t 1 + b1h11t 1 (2.17)
h22t = c20 + a2
2
2t 1 + b2h22t 1 (2.18)
h12 = 12
p
h11th22t (2.19)
In the CCC model, the conditional covariance (h12) between two series is proportional
to the square root of the product of the conditional variance for each series. There-
fore the conditional correlation (12) between the two series is assumed constant but
unknown over the sample, so it must be estimated. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 2.9. The conditional correlation coecient is signicant and positive. Based on
this model, both categories of deposits are correlated to the order of 15 per cent over
the sample.
The Irish banking sector experienced systemic stress in the period leading up the
application for external assistance. In addition to solvency issues, funding stress was
quite acute and customer deposits were quite volatile. The results in this section
shows evidence of inter-linkages across both categories of customer deposits during
this time. Future work might need to address the conditional mean model in more
detail.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter the dynamic behaviour of customer deposits, a key funding category
for banks since the global nancial crisis is examined. Specically weekly customer
6The Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) Model was also estimated. However, the resultant
time-varying correlation did not display meaningful trends.
65
deposit growth in Irish banks between March 2009 and December 2013 is modelled
using an ARDL (1,1) model with GARCH (1,1) errors. The sample includes a period
of systemic nancial stress. In line with the market discipline hypothesis, bank-specic
and country-specic risk factors are found to inuence weekly percentage changes in
customer deposits but there is also evidence of persistence in growth rates. Domestic
factors seem to matter to depositors as indicators of stress in international nancial
markets are not signicant. Surprisingly, no signicant macro-economic inuence is
found.
Between 11 March 2009 and 8 December 2010, customer deposit ows exhibit
large swings on a weekly basis. There is evidence of a regime shift in the conditional
variance in early-December 2010, coinciding with the onset of Ireland's Programme
for External Support. Prior to the regime shift, customer deposits are relatively
more volatile. The inclusion of a discrete variance shift lowers the persistence of the
estimated GARCH parameters. The sign of the shocks to deposit growth is not found
to have any explanatory power for its conditional variance. There is, however, a
strong GARCH-in-mean result. The conditional volatility of customer deposit ows
is found to negatively inuence deposit growth rates. Higher volatility appears to be
associated with higher levels of risk which in turn, inuences depositor behaviour.
This chapter also disaggregates customer deposits by type and investigates the
volatility of retail versus corporate deposits and also tests for inter-linkages. Corpo-
rate deposits are found to be relatively more volatile over the sample but there is
evidence of volatility transmission to retail deposits over the sample. The conditional
covariance between the series increases in late-2010, indicating higher interdependence
during periods of acute systemic funding risk. Further, although retail and corporate
depositors may be quite dierent, there is evidence that both series are positively
correlated to the order of 15 per cent during this time.
Further work in the area could involve developing the mean models for retail and
corporate deposits or disaggregating the data further and conducting a bank-level
analysis of deposit volatility spill-overs.
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2.7 Figures and tables
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Figure 2.1: Weekly percentage change in customer deposits in Irish banks: March
2009 to December 2013
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Figure 2.2: Kernel density of weekly customer deposit growth: March 2009 to De-
cember 2013
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Figure 2.3: Time-varying estimates of historical volatility with a one-year window:
March 2010 to December 2013
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Figure 2.4: ARDL(1,1) model of weekly customer deposit growth: March 2009 to
December 2014
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Estimated using Recursive Least Squares
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Figure 2.5: Coecient estimates from ARDL(1,1) model with 95% condence interval
GARCH(1,1) with ARDL: Standardized Residuals
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
GARCH(1,1) with ARDL:Standardized Squared Residuals
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Figure 2.6: Diagnostics on ARDL(1,1) - GARCH (1,1) model of customer deposits:
11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
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Figure 2.7: Fitted values for conditional variance from ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1)
model: 11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
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Figure 2.8: Smoothed probabilities of high and low variance regimes
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of Markov Switching variance with ARDL (1,1) - GARCH
(1,1) model and variance shift
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Figure 2.10: Out-of-sample performance of ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1) model: 8
January to 26 February 2014
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Figure 2.11: Contribution by deposit type to weekly growth rates
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Figure 2.12: Weekly growth rate of retail and corporate deposits: March 2009 to
December 2013
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Figure 2.13: Bivariate BEKK model on retail and corporate deposits
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Figure 2.14: 24-week rolling sample correlation between retail and corporate deposit
changes: August 2009 to December 2013
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of weekly percentage change in customer deposits
Mean -0.12 sig.level(mean=0) 0.053
Standard Deviation 0.76
Skewness -1.53 sig.level(sk=0) 0.000
Excess Kurtosis 5.61 sig.level(ku=0) 0.000
Jarque Berra 428.48 sig.level(jb=0) 0.000
Minimum Value -4.10 22 November 2010
Maximum Value 1.82 30 March 2009
Note: Data cover March 2009 through December 2013.
Table 2.2: ARDL (1,1) model of customer deposit growth: 11 March 2009 to 1 January
2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
4dt 1 0.262 0.258 0.173 0.175 0.175
(4.30) (4.24) (2.94) (2.98) (1.64)
4IEcdst 1 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(-2.35) (-2.39) (-2.63) (-2.63) (-2.06)
4BKspt 1 0.032 0.031 0.037 0.038 0.038
(2.65) (2.56) (3.26) (3.34) (2.08)
4ISEQgent 1 -0.02 -0.018 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037
(-0.93) (-0.98) (-2.11) (-2.08) (-1.73)
4MMspreadt 1 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.59) (-0.47)
4CISSt 1 0.008
(0.69)
4CONsentt 1 -0.007 -0.007
(-0.22) (-0.22)
Constant -0.066 -0.069 -0.079 -0.078 -0.077
(-1.47) (-1.55) (-1.76) (-1.73) (-1.86)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
Ljung Box Q(4) sig. level 0.16
ARCH(4) LM Test sig. level 0.00
Note: t-statistics in brackets. This table shows the results of running an ARDL (1,1) of the
weekly percentage change in deposits, 4dt. IEcds is the Irish sovereign senior CDS spread,
BKsp is the average of Irish listed banks' share price, ISEQgen refers to the value of the
ISEQ general (i.e., Irish stock index that excludes nancials), MMspread is the 3-month
Euribor/OIS spread, CISS is the ECB's composite indicator of systemic stress, CONsent
is the Irish consumer sentiment index. All variables are expressed as weekly percentage
changes. Column (5) uses Eicker-White standard errors.
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Table 2.3: P-values from multivariate Granger Causality F tests (4 March 2009 to 1
January 2014)
4d 4BKsp 4IEcds 4ISEQgen
4d 0.019 0.994 0.373 0.547
4BKsp 0.001 0.063 0.268 0.545
4IEcds 0.008 0.690 0.024 0.945
4ISEQgen 0.146 0.171 0.432 0.016
Note: This table shows the p-values from running multivariate Granger Causality F tests.
Specically a VAR(2) is used with the lag length based on Akaike Information Criteria. dt
refers to customer deposits, IEcds is the Irish sovereign senior CDS spread, BKsp is the
average of Irish listed banks' share price and ISEQgen refers to the value of the ISEQ general
(i.e., Irish stock index that excludes nancials). Data are weekly percentage changes.
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Table 2.4: ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1) model of weekly percentage change in deposits:
11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
Model of ht
0 0.009
(2.02)
1 0.155
(3.56)
1 0.826
(20.76)
Model of 4dt
Constant -0.007
(-0.22)
4dt 1 0.141
(1.95)
4IEcdst 1 -0.006
(-1.74)
4BKspt 1 0.044
(3.28)
4ISEQgent 1 -0.013
(-1.04)
Log Likelihood = -222.43
No. of Observations = 252
McLeod-Li(1983) p-value for residual ARCH = 0.83
Jarque Berra normality test of standardised residuals, p-value=0.00
Note: t-statistics in brackets.
75
Table 2.5: ARDL (1,1) - GARCH (1,1) model of weekly percentage change in deposits:
11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
Model of ht
0 0.088
(5.01)
1 0.144
(2.25)
1 0.227
(2.16)
Dt 0.62
(3.99)
Model of 4dt
4dt 1 0.157
(2.42)
4IEcdst 1 -0.005
(-1.89)
4BKspt 1 0.046
(3.32)
Log Likelihood = -203.16
No. of Observations = 252
McLeod-Li (1983) p-value for residual ARCH = 0.96
Note: t-statistics in brackets. Robust standard errors from Quasi Maximum Likelihood
Estimation.The table shows the estimation results from the following system of equations,
4dt = 14dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + t
t =
p
htvt; vt  N(0; 1)
ht = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 1ht 1 + Dt
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Table 2.6: ARDL(1,1) - GARCH-M (1,1) model of weekly percentage change in cus-
tomer deposits: 11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
Model of ht
0 0.085
(4.72)
1 0.145
(2.03)
1 0.251
(1.84)
Dt 0.553
(3.83)
Model of 4dt
Constant 0.033
(0.91)
4dt 1 0.134
(2.06)
4IEcdst 1 -0.006
(-1.67)
4BKspt 1 0.047
(3.26)
ht -0.268
(-2.36)
Log Likelihood = -200.6
No. of Observations = 252
McLeod-Li (1983) p-value for residual GARCH = 0.51
Note: t-statistics in brackets. Robust standard errors from Quasi Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation used. The table shows the estimation results from the following system of equations,
4dt = 0 + 14dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + ht + t
t =
p
htvt; vt  N(0; 1)
ht = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 1ht 1 + Dt
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics of weekly percentage change in retail and corporate
deposits: 2 March 2009 to 6 January 2014
4rt 4ct
Mean -0.042 -0.327
Standard Deviation 0.356 2.436
Skewness -0.300 -1.212
Excess Kurtosis 4.922 3.925
Jarque-Berra 260.208 225.288
p-value for JB=0 (0.00) (0.00)
Maximum value 1.19 (12:12:2011) 6.33 (30:03:2009)
Minimum value -2.01 (22:11:2010) -11.68 (15:11:2010)
78
Table 2.8: MV-GARCH-BEKK model of customer deposits: 11 March 2009 to 06
January 2014
Coecient S.E
Mean(1) -0.041 0.11
Mean(2) -0.026 0.02
c(1; 1) 0.445 0.11
c(2; 1) -0.136 0.03
c(2; 2) 0.000 0.34
a(1; 1) 0.366 0.05
a(1; 2) 0.012 0.01
a(2; 1) -0.464 0.46
a(2; 2) 0.397  0.08
b(1; 1) 0.871  0.05
b(1; 2) 0.070  0.02
b(2; 1) 1.200 0.87
b(2; 2) -0.739 0.06
No. of Obs: 254
Log Likelihood: -622.7
Test for multivariate ARCH: 22.25 (0.22)
Variance causality, ct to rt: Ho: a(1; 2) & b(1; 2) = 0 (Sig.level = 0.001)
Variance causality, rt to ct: Ho: a(2; 1) & b(2; 1) = 0 (Sig.level = 0.376)
Note:  refers to signicance at the 1 % level,  refers to signicance at the 5 % level and
 denotes signicance at the 10 % level. The table shows the estimation results from the
following system of equations,
4ct =  + 1t
4rt =  + 2t
1t = v1t
p
h11t
2t = v2t
p
h22t
itj
t 1  (0; Ht); i = 1; 2
Ht = C
0
C + A
0
t 10t 1A + B
0
Ht 1B
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Table 2.9: CCC model of corporate and retail deposit growth: 2 March 2009 to 6
January 2014
Coecient
 -0.046
(-0.36)
 -0.31
(-1.43)
c1 0.158
(1.21)
c2 0.028
(3.014)
a1 0.155
(2.42)
a2 0.232
(2.38)
b1 0.820
(11.81)
b2 0.550
(5.084)
12 0.150
(2.049)
Log Likelihood = -629.34
No. of Obs. = 254
Note: t statistics in parenthesis.The table shows the estimation results from the following
system of equations,
4ct =  + 1t
4rt =  + 2t
h11t = c10 + a1
2
1t 1 + b1h11t 1
h22t = c20 + a2
2
2t 1 + b2h22t 1
h12 = 12
p
h11th22t
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2.8 Appendices
Appendix 1: Preliminary statistical tests of customer deposits
and explanatory variables
Prior to estimation our variables of interest are transformed into logs and tested for
evidence of stationarity. As the average of the domestic banks' share price falls below
e1 over the sample, we add 1 to the entire series over the sample to ensure that the
log share price does not go negative.
Figure 2.15 shows the Autocorrelation and Partial autocorrelation functions for
the variables of interest in log levels over 50 lags. The slow, almost linear decay of
the ACFs is indicative of a unit root process for all variables. The Ljung-Box (Q)
statistic for all variables exceeds the chi-squared critical value of 34.8 with 50 degrees
of freedom and at 95 per cent signicance level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that
all of the autocorrelations up to 50 lags are zero cannot be rejected.
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Figure 2.15: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions
Each variable is then transformed into 100 times its rst dierence, prior to estima-
tion. The results are shown in Figure 2.16. The transformed variables are formally
tested for unit roots using Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests (ADF). Lag length for
lagged dependent variable is chosen using the Schwartz Bayesian Information Crite-
rion with the maximum number of additional lags set at 8 in all ADF regressions. No
trend or constant is initially included as the data are in rst dierences. The ADF
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Figure 2.16: Customer deposit growth rates and explanatory variables
tests incorporate a null hypothesis of a unit root. The critical values are those that are
linearly interpolated from the Fuller (1976) results (Estima, 2012). Table 2.10 shows
the results. In all cases, the null of a unit root can be rejected at the 1% signicance
level. This results holds even if an intercept is included in the ADF specication.
Each variable in logs is, therefore, dierence stationary and integrated of order one.
Table 2.10: Testing for unit roots using Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests.
Variable Test Statistic
4dt -13.58 ???
4BKspt -6.66 ???
4IEcdst -12.97 ???
4ISEQgent -18.81 ???
4MMspreadt -15.45 ???
Notes:??? represents 1% signicance level.
Lags chosen by SBC information criterion.
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Appendix 2: Initially testing the order of p and q in GARCH
model
In order to determine the order of p and q for the GARCH (p,q) model, informa-
tion criteria such as Akaike and Schwarz-Bayesian and the estimated log likelihood
functions are used to compare models. Specically an ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and a
GARCH(1,1) are compared for the initial goodness of t to our customer deposit
ows. The best-tting model will have the lowest information critera and highest log
likelihood. The results are shown in Table 2.11. As can be seen a GARCH(1,1) is
preferred.
Table 2.11: Comparing various GARCH (p,q) models
Order(p,q) AIC BIC Log likelihood
p=0,q=1 511.39 536.09 -248.69
p=0,q=2 492.28 520.53 -238.15
p=1,q=1 460.86 489.10 -222.43
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Appendix 3: Testing for variance regime shifts in customer de-
posits using Markov Switching models
To formally test the stability of the conditional variance estimated using our GARCH
(1,1) - ARDL (1,1) model, Markov Switching techniques are used. Such techniques
allow us to test if the statistical distribution of a series remains constant over the
sample period or switches between dierent regimes. Although the random variable
governing the switch between regimes is often unobserved, the use of a probabilistic
model based on a Markov chain imposes some structure on data generating process
for this random variable (Hamilton, 2008). A rst order Markov chain implies that
the probability that the data process is in a particular regime S at time t is dependent
on the regime in the previous period. 
t 1 is our information set up to time t  1.
Prob[St = i k 
t 1] = Prob[St = i k St 1 = j] (2.20)
The chapter tests if the variance of the error term, t in Equation 2.21 switches
over the sample using a rst-order Markov process and assuming constant transition
probabilities. Maximum Likelihood is used to estimate the switching regression. Two
regimes are found to be a good t.
4dt = 0 + 14dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + 4ISEQgent 1 + i;t (2.21)
where
i;t  N(0; 2i ); i = 1; 2
The results indicates that there is a high and low variance regime. The smoothed
probabilities in Figure 2.8 show that the switch occurs around 8 December 2010,
which is just after the formal application by Ireland for the external assistance on 28
November 2010. Prior to 8 December 2010, there is a high volatility regime. From
8 December 2010 to the end of our estimation sample, a regime of relatively lower
volatility prevails. Based on these results, 8 December 2010 is therefore used as the
date for the inclusion of our variance shift in our GARCH model. Figure 2.9 compares
the variance over the sample estimated using our Markov Switching specication with
the variance estimated from our ARDL(1,1) - GARCH (1,1) model with a variance
shift on 8 December 2010.
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Table 2.12: Markov Switching results: 11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
21 0.160
(9.34)
22 1.013
(7.76)
p(1; 1) 0.996
(210.59)
p(1; 2) 0.005
(0.78)
Log Likelihood = -218.65
No. of Observations = 252
Appendix 4: Testing for leverage eects
In this section, a number of tests are applied to the customer deposit model to investi-
gate if leverage eects are present over the sample. First, drawing on Enders(2010), we
regress the squared standardised residuals from the joint estimation of (2.7) and (2.9)
on a constant and lags of the standardised residuals (Equation 2.22).
4s2t = constant+ st 1 + st 2 + st 3 + t (2.22)
where s2t is standardised squared residuals and st i is the lagged squared residuals. If
there are leverage eects, the squared standardised residuals will be correlated with
the level of the standardised residuals. This can be formally tested with an F test
on the joint signicance of the coecients on the lagged standardised residuals. The
results are shown in Table 2.13. As can be seen, the null that coecients are equal
to zero cannot be rejected. There appears to be no statistical evidence of leverage
eects in the weekly customer deposit data based on this test.
Table 2.13: Testing for leverage eects
Variable Coecient estimate
st 1 0.12
(1.03)
st 2 -0.02
(-0.19)
st 3 -0.04
(-0.31)
constant 0.99
(8.26)
F(3, 245): 0.40 with sig. level 0.76
Note: t-statistics in brackets
An additional method to test the presence of the an asymmetric response to the
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size of shocks is to include a leverage term in the model of the conditional variance
and test its statistical signicance. Such a term can be modelled with an exponential
GARCH (E-GARCH) specication due to Nelson (1991) or with a Threshold GARCH
(TARCH) specication due to Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993) (GJR).
An E-GARCH with asymmetries can be estimated using the following equation;
4dt = 4dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + t; t =
p
htvt; vt  N(0; 1) (2.23)
ln(ht) = 0 + 1(
t 1p
ht 1
) + lt(
t 1p
ht 1
) + 1ln(ht 1) + Dt (2.24)
where l1 is our leverage term. Table 2.14 shows the estimation results. As can be
seen, l1 is not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
Table 2.14: Asymmetry with E-GARCH(1,1) - ARDL (1,1) model of weekly percent-
age change in deposits: 11 March 2009 to 01 January 2014
Model of ht
0 -1.16
(-2.65)
1 0.33
(2.28)
l1 (0.07)
(0.92)
1 0.54
(2.80)
Dt 0.99
(2.47)
Model of 4dt
4dt 1 0.18
(2.91)
4IEcdst 1 -0.01
(-2.11)
4BKspt 1 0.04
(2.78)
Log Likelihood = -205.87
No. of Observations = 252
Note:t-statistics in brackets
The GJR Threshold GARCH model is also applied using the following equation;
4dt = 4dt 1 + 4BKspt 1 + 4IEcdst 1 + t; t =
p
htvt; vt  N(0; 1) (2.25)
ht = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 1lt 1
2
t 1 + 1ht 1 + Dt (2.26)
where lt 1 is our leverage eect coecient on a dummy variable which is equal to
one when t 1 < 0 . This approach allows us to test the eects of both positive and
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negative shocks. If 1 is statistically signicant, there is a threshold eect in the data.
If 1 is statistically signicant and > 0, negative shocks will have a relatively larger
eect on the volatility of customer deposits than positive ones. As per Enders (2010,
pg. 156), the impact on conditional volatility from negative shocks will be given by
(1+1)
2
t 1. The results from the application of the GJR equations 2.25 and 2.26 to
the customer deposit table is shown in Table 2.15. 1 is not found to be statistically
signicant.
Table 2.15: GJR Threshold GARCH (1,1) - ARDL (1,1) model of weekly percentage
change in deposits: 11 March 2009 to 1 January 2014
Model of ht
0 0.08
(4.25)
1 0.25
(1.67)
1 -0.13
(-0.89)
1 0.25
(1.72)
Dt 0.59
3.77
Model of 4dt
4dt 1 0.157
(2.42)
4IEcdst 1 -0.005
(-1.89)
4BKspt 1 0.046
(3.32)
Log Likelihood = -202.81
No. of Observations = 252
Note:t-statistics in brackets.
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Chapter 3
Testing for Fundamentals, Fads
and Rational Bubbles in Irish
Commercial Property Prices:
1985Q1 to 2012Q4
3.1 Introduction
Property price dynamics have intrigued economists for years. Boom and bust condi-
tions feature regularly in this market often with signicant real eects. Researchers
continue to search for theoretical and empirical explanations for such developments.
While house prices garner relatively more attention due to the potential wealth eects
for households, commercial property prices also merit attention given the market's key
role in many nancial crises. Historical examples regularly cited are the Savings and
Loan crisis in the United States in the late-1980s, the Nordic crisis in the 1990s, the
East Asian and the Japanese crisis of the 2000s (Herring and Wachter, 1999 and
ECB, 2008). Commercial property-related lending tends to be relatively riskier than
residential mortgages during periods of nancial stress given that such lending is
primarily for investment purposes and as the exposures are larger and more hetero-
geneous. Also some borrowers in this market tend to be covered by limited liability.
The Irish nancial crisis is a recent example of the adverse impact of commercial
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property prices on nancial stability. Real Irish commercial property prices increased
by circa 200 per cent between 1995 and mid-2007 with bank credit the funding of
choice for many investors. This was a period of rapid economic growth for the Ireland
with GDP per capita converging on our European counterparts1 and borrowing costs
declining in line with policy rates, a reduction in perceived risk and increased access
to cheaper European funding markets. The combination of favourable demand condi-
tions and an increased willingness to supply credit boosted the commercial property
market in Ireland. The Irish housing market also followed a similar pattern.
By end-2012, however, commercial property prices had fallen by almost 70 per
cent from their peak in 2007 with many Irish banks facing expected losses on their
property exposures. Market liquidity evaporated and investor sentiment became in-
creasingly negative towards anything property related. While the global nancial
crisis provided the external shock, vulnerabilities within the domestic banking sys-
tem such as imprudent lending standards and skewed balance sheets led to a costly
systemic crisis.2 The misallocation of real resources up to 2007, with aggregate in-
vestment heavily dependent on property also rendered domestic demand vulnerable to
such shocks. While adjustments in both residential and commercial property markets
caused problems for the banks, the initial phases of the crisis (i.e., 2008-2010) saw
relatively higher declines in the quality of the commercial portfolios and sharper price
deation.3 The Irish case and other historical examples highlight the importance of
detecting unsustainable commercial price developments, particularly if investors are
highly leveraged.
Even if a property boom is not accompanied by rapid credit growth, its reversal
can have real eects. Investment may ow into this market to gain a high return,
creating a potential misallocation of economic resources and aecting the relative
price of other assets (Blanchard and Watson, 1982). Periods of rapid price growth
are generally not sustainable and their reversal may be abrupt. Persistent deviations
of prices from fundamentally justied values may signal future adjustment and so
provide a useful guide among other indicators. There is renewed interest in the
identication of property price misalignment following the recent global nancial crisis
and policy makers' focus on actively mitigating systemic risk using macro-prudential
policy (Hartmann, 2015). Macro-prudential researchers are focused on developing
1See Honohan and Walsh, 2002.
2See Honohan (2010) and Regling and Watson (2010) for details on the origins of the Irish crisis.
3The Irish Government established the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in 2010 to
remove problem commercial property loans from domestic banks' balance sheets.
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indicators to aid the systemic risk assessment of property markets (ECB, 2011 and
ESRB, 2014). This chapter aims to contribute to this research drawing on the Irish
experience.
The estimation of Irish commercial property prices has received relatively less at-
tention in the literature compared with house prices. There are a number of published
papers on supply and rent dynamics in the Dublin oce market (McCartney, 2008,
2011) and on land prices (Browne and Fagan, 1992, Roche and McQuinn, 2000). In-
ternational commercial property markets have been the subject of a number of papers
such as Hendershott (2000) on the Sydney oce market, Chervachidze and Wheaton
(2013) on capitalisation rates4 in the United States and Ball and Grilli (1997) on
commercial property investment in the United Kingdom. Commercial property prices
have also featured in cross-country studies such as Davis and Zhu (2011) who exam-
ine the link between bank lending and price determination and in Hendershott et al.,
(2005) who review tests for market rationality in a number of countries.
To address the gap in the Irish literature, this chapter examines the dynamic be-
haviour of Irish commercial property prices. First, we investigate if quarterly price
movements can be explained by economic fundamentals such as income and interest
rates using reduced form econometrics between 1985Q1 and 2012Q4. A further speci-
cation controls for the inuence of credit on price movements. Given the diculty in
correctly approximating a fundamental price, some simple statistical analysis based
on the price-to-rent ratio is used to complement the econometrics. The results show
periods over the sample where commercial property prices persistently deviate from
fundamentally-determined prices, revealing a non-fundamental price component in the
data. Positive misalignment or overvaluation is found in the late-1980s/early-1990s
and consistently through the 2000s up to 2007, while there is evidence of undervalu-
ation in the mid-1990s and during the crisis period.
To gain a better understanding of the nature of the misalignment, the chapter
further tests if there is evidence of an irrational fad or a rational stochastic bubble
in Irish commercial property prices over the period under study. Such models have
been used in the stock market literature to explain why equity prices vary relative
to their intrinsic value based on theoretically justied determinants (e.g., Schiller,
1984, Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1991 and Blanchard and Watson, 1982). The
underlying theory and methodology from this literature are applicable to commercial
4The ratio of net operating income to price or capital values.
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property given its role as an important investment asset. A deeper understanding
of commercial property price dynamics can help to model and forecast prices more
eciently. The fads theory assumes temporary deviations of prices from equilibrium
values due to some form of market irrationality. Therefore, if Irish prices are subject to
faddish behaviour, the deviation between actual and fundamental prices should have
explanatory power for future price returns. The rational bubble hypothesis assumes
that prices returns dier depending on whether prices are in an expansionary or
contractionary phase. So non-linear estimation is required. Investors are aware that
the market is subject to bubble-like behaviour so their existence is factored into price
expectations. As the boom period develops, investors demand higher and higher prices
to compensate for losses when prices eventually crash. With both fads and bubbles,
the collective action of investors lead to price spirals and periods where prices move
out-of-line with fundamentals.
The chapter draws on an empirical approach by Van Norden (1996) and Schaller
and Van Norden (2002) which allows us to test between a fad and a bubble us-
ing regime-switching techniques. The framework nests the fad specication within
a general rational bubble equation so that by testing the validity of the restrictions
associated with the presence of a fad, we can infer which model best ts the data.
There are some dierences in the empirical approach. Schaller and Van Norden use
simple switching techniques, while this chapter uses Markov switching methodology
to capture persistence. Time-invariant transition probabilities are assumed rather
than imposing the assumption that the size of the misalignment governs the switch
between regimes. Based on the Irish experience, the possibility that other exogenous
factors such as an expectations shock or news may also generate the switch between
regimes is preferred. The restrictions imposed by the fads model cannot be accepted
and there is some evidence in favour of a bubble. The theoretical features of the
bubble hypothesis, however, are not fully supported across our three estimates of
misalignment or non-fundamental price series.
The chapter is structured into a number of sections. Section 3.2 discusses the
theory of asset prices in the context of fads and stochastic bubbles. Section 3.3 focuses
on the Irish commercial property market and species a model for real prices, which
allows the identication of periods where prices deviates from their fundamental value.
A statistical indicator of misalignment is also used to complement the econometrics.
The estimated misalignment is used in section 3.4 to test for the presence of a fad or
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a bubble in Irish commercial property prices. A summary and the main conclusions
are contained in the nal section.
3.2 Asset pricing theories: irrational fads versus ra-
tional bubbles
This chapter applies the analytical framework of Schaller and Van Norden (2002,
hereafter SVN), to Irish real commercial property prices. The SVN approach is based
on two particular strands of the equity price literature that seek to explain why prices
vary so much relative to the intrinsic value of the asset. The two strands are fads
and rational bubbles. Although potentially similar in general terms, the explanation
for fads and rational collapsing bubbles dier in the dynamic description of price
behaviour and in their assumptions regarding the rationality of market participants.
Fads are associated with some form of irrationality among investors that cause
prices to temporarily deviate away from equilibrium values (Schiller, 1984). As prices
are assumed to eventually return to an equilibrium value, proponents of the fad theory
believe that price changes may, therefore, be predictable at certain horizons which con-
icts with the ecient market hypothesis (EMH). The fads model in Cutler, Poterba
and Summers (1991) is used in the SVN framework.
It is assumed that asset prices have both a fundamental pft and non-fundamental
component pnft with lower case denoting logs in all equations.
pt = p
f
t + p
nf
t (3.1)
The fundamental price is assumed to be non-stationary and vt is a white noise
error term.
pft = p
f
t 1 + vt (3.2)
vt  iid(0; 2v)
The non-fundamental price is assumed to follow a stationary autoregressive pro-
cess of order (1) with the coecient  bounded between zero and one (3.3). The
assumption of this stationary component implies that returns may be predictable.
pnft = p
nf
t 1 + et; (3.3)
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1 >  > 0; et  iid(0; 2e)
By re-arranging equations (3.1) through (3.3), we can express log price changes be-
tween period t and t+1 relative to deviations between actual prices and fundamental
prices.
pt+1   pt = 0 + b(pt   pft ) + et+1
Fundamental prices are dicult to observe in practice so pft must be estimated
using a proxy ppt which introduces some measurement error, wt.
ppt = p
f
t + !t; (3.4)
wt  iid(0; 2!)
Assuming !t  0 in (3.4), we can replace pft with ppt to yield (3.5)
pt+1   pt = 0 + b(pt   ppt ) + et+1 (3.5)
The dierence between the actual price and the fundamental price at time t is
assumed to have explanatory power for price changes at time t + 1 if the market is
subject to a fad . In Cutler et al., (1991) the fads model is estimated as a simple
linear regression. If the asset price series follows a fad, the coecient b should be
negative so that any misalignment or gap will fall over time. An increase in the gap
today leads to a decrease in rate of price growth tomorrow. As these misalignments
are not sustainable, prices do not exhibit explosive behaviour.
The term bubble is often more popular than fads to discuss periods of boom
and bust in asset prices among the general public. The existence and exact deni-
tion of a bubble, however, is the subject of much debate among economists.5 The
SVN framework focuses on stochastic bubbles as dened by Blanchard and Watson
(1982). Collapsing bubbles are assumed to be jointly consistent with the no arbitrage
assumption of the EMH in the presence of rational expectations (Blanchard and Wat-
son, 1982, hereafter BW). In equilibrium, an asset price Pt is assumed to equal the
discounted present value of future income or dividends Dt, with the latter assumed
to represent the fundamental price. The discount rate r is assumed constant.
5See Taipalus (2013) and Brunnermeier in the 2008 New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics for
good reviews of the various types of economic bubbles.
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Pt =
Et(Pt+1 +Dt)
1 + r
(3.6)
According to BW, there are other price solutions, which satisfy the equilibrium
condition. The market price can, therefore, deviate from fundamental values without
violating the no arbitrage condition. Prices are assumed to contain both a funda-
mental and bubble component, with the size of the bubble Bt given by the following
equation,
Bt  Pt   P ft (3.7)
The bubble must grow in expectations each period at a rate r to entice investors
to participate in the market.
Et(Bt+1) = (1 + r) Bt (3.8)
BW consider one possible example of a rational bubble where the bubble will
survive in state (S) or burst in state (C) with probability, (q) and (1 q) respectively.
If the bubble survives, returns must be higher than r so as to compensate for the
crash.
Et(Bt+1jS) = (1 + r
q
) Bt (3.9)
The expected value of the bubble in a collapse is zero. In other words if the bubble
is positive and it collapses, the actual price falls by the value of the bubble.
Et(Bt+1jC) = 0 (3.10)
In summary, stochastic bubbles are assumed to be consistent with rational expec-
tations, even though prices can move out-of-line with fundamentals, as the expected
discounted value of future bubbles is reected in current prices. Although these bub-
bles are assumed to grow over time, they will eventually burst with some probability.
As actual prices increase above fundamental prices, the probability of crash increases,
justifying further increases in prices or higher returns to compensate investors for the
corresponding increase in risk. Investors know that there may be a bubble and that
prices will eventually decline. They will participate in the market as they believe they
can exit before the price collapses (Taipalus, 2013). Stochastic collapsing bubbles can
occur in certain markets where fundamentals are dicult to assess; there are no con-
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straints on short-selling and there are new market participants over time (Blanchard
and Watson, 1982).
SVN extend the BW model in two ways. First it assumed that the probability of
the bubble surviving, q is negatively related to the proportional size of the bubble,
bt  Bt
Pt
(3.11)
SVN also allow for the possibility that bubbles may partially collapse in a particu-
lar period as they contend some market crashes may be gradual rather than instanta-
neous. They relate the expected size of the bubble in state C to the size of the bubble
in the previous period. Applying a rst-order Taylor expansion to the conditional
expected returns in each state, SVN derive the following linear expressions for the
expected price returns (omitting the expectations operator).
Ri;t+1 = i0 + ibbt + ei;t+1; (3.12)
ei;t+1  N(0; 2i ); i = S;C
Equation (3.12) is the general regime switching model of SVN. Ri;t+1 refers to
price returns between time t and t + 1, and bt is the estimated bubble term. The
bubbles model implies that expected returns vary depending on the prevailing regime.
Expected returns should be higher in the survival state relative to collapse state.
Consequently, s;0 need not equal c;0 and b;s must be greater than b;c.
In contrast to the fads literature, the theoretical underpinnings of the rational
bubbles models are considered well developed but the empirical results are relatively
less conclusive (Camerer, 1989). Many empirical papers test for the presence of fads
and collapsing bubbles separately but the approach of SNV facilitate the joint testing
of both. The novel feature of SVN is the assumption that the error term in (3.5) is
heteroscedastic due to presence of two states. It is assumed that the variance of 2e in
the survival period is less than the variance in the crash period. Many of the empirical
tests for the presence of fads nd that the residuals are heteroscedastic. SNV assume
heteroscedastic returns for two further reasons. First, to ensure that when testing
for fads, the presence of heteroscedastic residuals do not aect the results. Second,
this assumption is invoked to ensure possible identication of the fads model with
hypothesis testing. With this innovation, the fads model is nested within the general
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regime switching specication for a rational bubble.
The fads model implies that expected returns (conditioned on Bt) will be the
same in each regime. The equality of the point estimates for the intercept and slope
coecients can be tested using Wald Tests. Both restrictions can be jointly tested
using Likelihood Ratio tests. If s;0 6= c;0 and b;s 6= b;c we cannot accept the series
under study conforms to the fads model and must consider the alternative hypothesis
of a rational bubble. Conversely, if the restrictions are found to be valid, we must
reject the hypothesis of a bubble in favour of the fads model.
SVN apply this approach in a number of papers covering exchange rates and
equity prices. One such example is Schaller and Van Nordon (2002). The authors
examine monthly US stock price data over the period 1926 to 1989 for evidence of
fads or rational bubbles using regime switching techniques. They nd some evidence
that the estimated deviations from the fundamental price have predictive power for
stock market returns, thereby supporting the fads model thesis. However, when the
restrictions imposed by the fads model are tested relative to a general regime switching
specication, these restrictions are generally rejected. In the bubble scenario, the
coecients in the collapsing regime are found to be negative and smaller than the
slope coecient in the survival regime which is in line with ex ante expectations.
Expected returns should be positively related to the size of the bubble in the survival
period to compensate investors. The paper, however, nds a consistently negative
sign. In summary, the paper nds that the data do not fully conform to the fads
hypothesis but there is not overwhelmingly consistent evidence in favour of rational
bubbles.
In an Irish context, Roche (1999) looks at Dublin and UK house prices from late-
1970s up to 1999 and applies the SNV regime switching framework. Roche (1999)
tests between three hypotheses, namely that prices can be explained by either fun-
damentals, fads or stochastic bubbles. Both endogenous and exogenous switches are
assumed. Roche (1999) nds evidence of a stochastic bubble but estimates that the
probability of a crash in Dublin house prices in 1999 was less than the probability
estimated for Britain in late-1980s. The UK housing market suered a signicant
adjustment in late-1980s/early-1990s.
To apply this approach to the Irish market, it is rst necessary to estimate a fun-
damental commercial property price series or approximate a non-fundamental com-
ponent in the price data to obtain our explanatory variable. The need to proxy
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both components introduces measurement error. Therefore, any estimate of a non-
fundamental price may be biased. However according to Roche (1999, 2000), even if
we mis-specify the magnitude or the relative size of the bubble term, it should not
aect our tests for regime-switching models. Wald tests for coecient restrictions
and the associated Likelihood Ratio tests are not sensitive to linear transformations
of non-fundamental prices/bubble component. Therefore, while noting its existence
we assume that the measurement error is negligible.
3.3 Irish commercial property prices and fundamen-
tal values
3.3.1 Modelling commercial property prices
In this subsection a model of Irish commercial property prices is specied. Given the
shortage of Irish literature specically on price determination6, we must look to in-
ternational studies for guidance. The international research on commercial property
prices focuses either on testing the market for eciency using an empirical nance-
based approach or on estimating a reduced form econometric model where the un-
derlying economic determinants of prices are suggested by economic theory in a de-
mand/supply framework. As noted by Hordahl and Packer (2007), there are many
challenges associated with the nance-based approach given that both the property-
risk premium and expected future cash ows are unobservable and therefore must
be estimated. To approximate a fundamental price, this chapter, therefore, focuses
on investigating the economic determinants using reduced form econometrics rather
than the nance approach.
The analytical framework of Davis and Zhu (2004 & 2011, hereafter DZ) is closely
followed. Using a a reduced form model 7, commercial property cycles are shown to
be inuenced by two channels, namely exogenous shocks to the economic cycle and
by market-specic features over the cycle which can amplify the eects of the macro-
economic shocks leading to oversupply. In the DZ paper, commercial property prices
are determined by a four equation system.
Dt  N [1  F (Pt)]L(Yt; it; Pt; !t)
Pt
; Ly > 0; Li < 0; Lp > 0 (3.13)
6The lack of published academic research on modelling Irish capital values may reect the fact
that Irish commercial property data are not publicly available.
7The reduced form model draws on earlier work by Carey (1990) and Wheaton (1999).
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Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It 1 (3.14)
It 1 = Bt 1(Yt 1; it 1; Pt 1; !t 1), where By > 0 ,Bi < 0, Bp > 0 (3.15)
Dt = Kt (3.16)
Equation (3.13) describes the market demand Dt for commercial property at current
prices Pt which is a function of the number of potential investors N and their access to
bank credit for commercial property L. It is assumed that these investors dier only in
terms of their reservation price due to either private information or dierent valuation
approaches. The sum of these reservation prices follow a cumulative distribution
function, F (Pt). If an investor's reservation price exceeds the current market value,
they will pursue the property and seek external funding.
Investment in commercial property is usually highly leveraged and bank credit
is a key source of funding. To overcome asymmetric information on the degree of
counterparty credit risk on the loan contract, banks demand collateral so commercial
property prices are closely linked to credit growth (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and
Bernanke et al., 1994). A positive relationship is assumed between credit and current
prices. Credit market imperfections and possible departures from rational expecta-
tions are cited as reasons for the assumed reliance on current prices by banks. DZ
also assume that credit availability is positively related to the investor's endowment
which can be proxied by personal disposable income or real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Investors can borrow more if interest rates, it are low and banks' lending
standards are accommodative, !t.
Equations (3.14) and (3.15) focus on construction and supply-side dynamics. If
prices exceed replacement cost, developers will initiate new projects using bank -
nancing. Construction supply is assumed xed in the short run due to development
lags (assumed one period here). Therefore the stock of new supply Kt will evolve
according to (3.14) where  is the depreciation rate and It 1 is the stock of com-
pleted development projects last period, which like investment also depends upon
bank credit for nancing Bt 1. The same factors which determine credit supply to
investors are also assumed to apply to construction nancing. The market clears when
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demand equals supply (3.16) so market prices P and level of commercial property K
are assumed to be constant over time in equilibrium.
The model predicts that prices and bank credit are positively related but bank
credit may have a negative impact on prices in the long run if there is oversupply.
While it is assumed that income and interest rates impact commercial property prices,
the macro eects may vary across markets depending on the relative elasticity of
supply and demand. DZ contend that if the supply response is relatively elastic,
overbuilding in response to a positive income shock will dampen price growth leading
to a price cycle. Conversely if the supply response is quite slow, market prices may
increase even faster than fundamental prices resulting in misalignment.
DZ use this framework to examine the macro-economic determinants of commer-
cial property prices using an unbalanced panel of 17 countries generally over the
period 1970 to 2003. Irish data are included.8 The paper uses both panel and vector
error correction models for individual countries. The empirical work relies on the
following ve variables; real commercial property prices, real GDP, real interest rates,
real credit and real private investment. In general, the results accord with the model
in that a positive relationship is found between GDP and prices in both the short
and long run while credit is found to be positively related to prices in the short run
but negatively related in the long run. Property prices are also found to positively
aect bank credit. A negative relationship is generally found between investment and
prices. Contrary to a priori expectations, Davis and Zhu (2011) nd a positive long-
run relationship between short-run interest rates and prices in some markets. Some
of the results vary by type of property market and according to where a country is in
its property cycle.
Following DZ we hypothesise that current Irish commercial property prices are
determined by macro-economic determinants such as real GDP and real long-term in-
terest rates, among other factors. Even in the absence of a credit channel, an increase
in economic growth should lead to an increase in investor demand for commercial
property, all other things being equal. This is a derived demand equation as investors
anticipate an increase in demand for rental space for oces, retail and industrial units.
This in turn, leads to an increase in expected income/rental return on commercial
property, which may increase investors' reservation prices. Ireland experienced rapid
economic expansion from the late-1990s with a marginal slowdown in 2000/01. The
8The Irish data are annual and cover the period 1982 to 2002.
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Celtic Tiger years was a time of economic convergence on our European counter-
parts. Unsustainable economic imbalances, however, arose towards the end of this
time with domestic demand heavily reliant on property. Figure 3.1 shows that the
annual change in real commercial prices and in real GDP in Ireland appears to move
broadly in tandem between 1985 and 2012. Although clearly highly cyclical, property
price growth appears to have a relatively greater amplitude than GDP growth. Fig-
ure 3.1 also compares the series in logs which shows the relatively higher adjustment
in commercial property prices after 2007.
Davis and Zhu (2011) use real short-term interest rates in their model. Long-
term rates are preferred here to proxy for both the cost of external nance and the
discount factor or required rate of return 9. In line with theory we expect a negative
relationship between long-term real interest rates and commercial property prices.
An increase in funding costs faced by investors or in the discount rate can lead to a
decline in demand for commercial property. Interest rates and prices are compared in
Figure 3.2. The period between the advent of European Monetary Union (1999) and
the beginning of the global nancial crisis (2007) saw historically lower real interest
rates and this coincided with high commercial property prices in Ireland.
The role of credit in driving property prices is also examined. According to Woods
(2007), commercial property-related credit increased signicantly up to 2007, account-
ing for a quarter of total private sector credit to Irish residents. Financial liberalisation
and deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s followed by closer integration of Euro-
pean capital markets in 2000s allowed banks to increase their credit supply to meet
rising demand. The close links between corporate credit and commercial property
prices are shown in Figure 3.3.
Table 3.1 displays some descriptive statistics for real prices, income, credit and
interest rates over the period 1985 to 2012. Although GDP records a higher level
of maximum quarterly growth (i.e., circa 11 per cent) over the period, the price and
credit series have relatively higher maximum quarterly declines. Prices fell by almost
19 per cent, credit by 16 per cent while GDP declined by 6.3 per cent in one quarter.
Real rental gures and unemployment are also included for comparison as both series
are included in alternative estimates of misalignment. Over the sample, the rental
series did not increase to the same extent as prices, credit or GDP with a maximum
9For completeness in the Appendix, real short-term rates are included in a variation on the
specication.
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growth rate of 5 per cent. During the crisis, the Irish unemployment rate increased
by a maximum of 23 per cent.
All of the aforementioned factors focus on demand-side inuences. Unfortunately
a long-run consistent series on commercial property supply in the Irish market is not
available. There have been some papers on supply-side dynamics but these are based
on low frequency data. Some examples are McCartney (2008 and 2011) which refers
to the Dublin oce market and look at vacancy rates. DZ use private investment as a
proxy but in the Irish case, this variable is highly correlated with GDP, given the role
of domestic demand in driving economic activity prior to the crisis. The Appendix
discusses this issue further.
Lagged commercial property prices are considered as a possible explanatory vari-
able in one of the specications in line with DZ. There is a high degree of persistence
in the Irish commercial property price data, which is common in valuation-based in-
dices. In addition to valuation practices, low levels of liquidity/market transactions
and the general heterogeneity of assets in this market complicate the price discovery
process. Other issues potentially leading to price errors by investors or valuers are the
dependence on local knowledge (Zhu, 2003), high transaction costs, lack of a common
market place and the inability to engage in short-selling practices (Hendershott et
al., 2005). Therefore, as noted by DZ, prices may deviate from fundamental values
because of market-specic characteristics creating endogenous cycles which amplify
the eects of economic factors. Although it is not possible to fully control for these
idiosyncratic market features, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in one of
the specications may go some way in capturing institutional features that can cause
persistence in the data.
3.3.2 Data and preliminary statistical tests
Data on Irish commercial property prices are obtained from the Society of Chartered
Surveyors & the Investment Property Databank (SCS/IPD) Irish index. The Irish
commercial property price data cover the sectors oce, retail and industrial as well as
providing a total series. The aggregate data are of interest to this chapter. According
to IPD the Irish index should be broadly representative of market activity in our
sample covering 80 per cent of outstanding commercial property holdings in Ireland
as at December 2011 (IPD, 2012). The properties included the index are mainly in
the Dublin area.
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In common with other international commercial property data, the SCS/IPD Irish
Index is based on valuations of standing investments by participating investors rather
than actual transactions in the market. Ball, Lizieri and MacGregor, (2006) highlight
that these valuation indices suer from smoothing which can lead to low volatility and
complicate comparisons with other asset classes where price data are freely available.
These authors contend that the index value at each point in time is a weighted-average
of the true market value and past values. Possible reasons oered are; valuers seem to
react slowly to news with conventional valuation techniques based on extrapolation
of past values and the fact that valuation may not be collected at exactly the same
date. With regard to the latter point, Ball et al., 2006 notes that published indices
may be a weighted average of valuations taken over a two-month period especially if
the index has a large coverage. Additionally, Whitley and Windram, (2003) highlight
that low market liquidity makes it dicult to assess if these valuation-based indices
are representative of movements in actual market capital values.
The commercial price data used in this study cover the period 1984 through 2012.
As quarterly data are only available from the rst quarter of 1995 from SCS/IPD,
annual index data from 1984 are interpolated to form a historical quarterly series (See
the Appendix 1 for further details). To convert the SCS/IPD index to a price series
in levels, an average commercial property price per square metre is estimated from
sectoral (i.e., oce, retail and industrial) rent and yield data from CBRE EMEA Q1
2013. These data are aggregated using a weighted-average with each sector's share
of IPD portfolio in Q1 2013 used as weights. Data are in Euro per square meter.
Commercial property price data are deated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
which is from the Central Statistics Oce (CSO).
In terms of other explanatory variables, GDP is sourced from the CSO and the
Central Bank of Ireland. These data are available quarterly from 1997Q1 from the
CSO. Prior to 1997, the annual data are interpolated and are from the Central Bank's
macro-modeling dataset (See McQuinn, O'Donnell and Ryan, 2005 for further details).
Corporate credit data are also sourced from the Central Bank of Ireland and is de-
ned as total private-sector credit less household credit and less credit for nancial
intermediation. Both series are also deated using the CPI. The long-term real in-
terest rate is proxied by ten-year Irish Government bond yield less the CPI ination
rate. These data are sourced from the Central Bank of Ireland and Thomson/Reuters
Datastream. Residential mortgage rate data from the Central Bank are also used as
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an alternative to the bond yields.
Prior to estimation, real GDP, real corporate credit, real commercial property
prices are transformed into logs. These transformed variables and the real inter-
est rate are tested to see if they are stationary using an Autocorrelation Function
(ACF) or correlogram with up to 50 lags (Figure 3.4). All variables are found to
non-stationary in logs/levels. The slow almost linear decline of the autocorrelations
suggests the presence of a unit root. Formal unit root testing using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests conrm the nding10. First dierences
are subsequently taken to remove the unit root.
Table 3.2 presents the results of unit root testing on the transformed variables.
Unit root tests are considered to have low power in distinguishing between a unit
root and near unit root process. Therefore for robustness, two formal tests are used,
namely Phillips-Perron (PP) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF). For the PP test
four lags and a constant are chosen while both two and four lags and a constant are
in the ADF test. No trend is included as the data are in rst dierences. Both of
these tests incorporate a null hypothesis of a unit root. MacKinnon approximate p
values based on MacKinnon (1994) are used to determine the signicance of the test
statistics. The PP test indicates that all dierenced variables are integrated of order
(0). This result is conrmed for interest rates, prices and GDP using the ADF test
with either four or two lags. However, using one lag, the ADF test conrms that a
unit root is not present in the credit growth variable. Changes in the unemployment
rate are included in the test as this variable is used instead of GDP in the short-run
model in subsection 3.3.3.
The preceding paragraph shows that our variables of interest are integrated of
the same order. We now turn to testing for possible cointegrating relationship given
the theoretical justication for long-run relationship between the variables. Given
that we could have potentially more than one cointegrating vector, we rely on the
Johansen (1988) methodology to test for the number of cointegrating equations. No
evidence of cointegration using all four variables over the full sample period is found.
However, omitting credit, we nd some evidence of one cointegrating vector between
prices, GDP and interest rates using the trace statistic (Table 3.3). The maximum
eigenvalue statistic, however, suggests two cointegrating relationships. If two lags are
10Results are not included for brevity but are available upon request.
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used in the deterministic regression instead of four, both the maximum eigenvalue
and the trace statistic agree on one cointegrating relationship.
A long-run relationship between prices, GDP and interest rates is, therefore, as-
sumed based on economic theory. This specication is used in the next section to
approximate a fundamental commercial property price. It is also likely that credit
is an important part of the Irish commercial property story and there is a strong
empirical literature linking property and credit cycles. Therefore a simple time-series
model is also specied, to estimate the relationship between prices and credit, while
also controlling for income and interest rates.
3.3.3 Empirical results and misalignment
In this subsection, two dierent estimates of misalignment between the fundamental
price and actual commercial property prices are discussed.
Cointegration - income and interest rates
A long-run relationship is assumed to exist between commercial property prices, GDP
and interest rates, all in real terms, given the results of the cointegration testing
and based on theory. The Engle-Granger (1987) two-step approach is used with the
long-run specication approximating our fundamental price. The following linear
specication is used,
ct = 0 + 1gdpt + 2it + t (3.17)
where ct is the log of real commercial property prices, gdpt is the log of real gross
domestic product and it is real long-term interest rates
11. In addition to simple
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fully Modied OLS (FM-OLS)12 is used to estimate
the regression as the latter controls for potential endogeneity and serial correlation13.
11Appendix 3 also presents the results of some alternative explanatory variables drawing on Davis
and Zhu (2011) and economic theory. The results are not fully in line with theory. Therefore this
specication is preferred.
12According to Enders (2010, pg. 426-427), inference may be inappropriate if there is evidence
of serial correlation in the errors of the cointegrating vector. Endogeneity may also be an issue. In
this instance, the procedure of Phillips and Hansen (1990) may be used instead. This procedure
adds leads and lags of changes in the explanatory variables to the regression and adjusts the t
statistics from the original equation using a modied version of the variance of the error term from
the expanded equation.
13Tests for higher-order serial correlation using the Ljung-Box test on the simple OLS residuals
suggest the presence of autocorrelation (Ljung-Box Q statistic for 8 lags is 311.8.with a signicance
level of 0.000).
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Table 3.4 shows the results, which are similar across both methods. The explana-
tory variables have the expected sign and are statistically signicant. A one per cent
increase in real GDP will lead to a 0.3 per cent increase in real capital values, all
other things being equal. As interest rates are not in logs, the point estimate for its
coecient shows the semi-elasticity of prices with respect to rates.
Figure 3.5 plots the actual prices against the tted values from the OLS regression
and also displays the residuals over the sample period. Although the tted values track
the actual values, there are periods of deviation between the two series. Actual prices
are above the tted value or fundamentally justied prices in the late-1980s/early-
1990s, briey in late-1990s and from 2004 to late-2007. There is a spike in the residuals
in 2009/2010 suggesting overvaluation which would be contrary to intuition given that
this was a period of falling prices and nancial stress. This misalignment seems to
be driven by the relatively higher fall in the fundamental price or tted values. Real
rates increased in 2009 and the Irish economy began to contract signicantly. Both
of these factors would have reduced fundamental prices in the model. Actual prices
do not seem to have fallen as sharply over this time.
After 2011, there is marked divergence between actual and the tted values until
the end of our sample. Given the emergence of the European sovereign debt crisis in
mid-2010, long-term nominal interest rates as proxied by the Irish Government bond
yield increased. This would have had an initial dampening eect on fundamental
prices until the positive eects of the emerging macroeconomic recovery took eect
toward the end of the sample (See Figure 3.1). Therefore after a rebound in 2009,
fundamental prices decline briey in 2010 before increasing in 2011 and 2012. By
contrast, actual prices continue to fall until end-2012 suggesting that other factors
not captured in our model are at play. Negative investor sentiment may be one such
factor. The period from late-2007 to 2012 was one of risk aversion and very low
levels of activity in the Irish commercial property market. As noted in the Central
Bank of Ireland's 2015 Macro-Financial Reviews, 2013 was a turning point for Irish
commercial property. Investor appetite returned and the market began to recover.
The low interest rate environment and the possibility of purchasing large distressed
commercial property loan portfolios attracted many institutional investors and other
funds to the Irish market.
As noted, the European sovereign debt crisis caused bond yields to spike in 2010
due to concerns about the credit worthiness of the Irish Government. These devel-
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opments raise concerns that that this variable may not be a good proxy for either
the real cost of funding faced by rms investing in commercial real estate or the dis-
count rate over this time. Also the model is estimated over a period that covers the
Irish nancial crisis which was accompanied by a severe contraction in the domestic
economy. Therefore it is important to check the stability of the estimated long-run
relationship. Stability of the estimated parameters is formally tested using a Bai-
Perron test14 and recursive least squares (RLS) on the long-run equation (3.17). The
RLS results indicate that although the coecient on real GDP is broadly stable, the
coecient on the interest rate variable appears to trend downwards (Figure 3.6). The
Bai-Perron Break Point test indicates that there may have been a slight shift in the
estimated relationship between the explanatory variables and prices in late-2009.
Given the potential concerns about the stability of the interest rate coecient,
the bond yield series is replaced by the real residential mortgage interest rate. This
rate should be a good proxy for funding costs in the commercial property investment
market as residential mortgages are also typically extended for long maturities. Also
this variable should better reect the price of bank credit during the sovereign bond
crisis. As can be seen in Figure 3.7, both rates in real terms follow similar trends over
time. Therefore, (3.17) is re-estimated using the mortgage rate. Table 3.5 shows the
results. Both variables have the expected signs and are statistically signicant. The
point estimate for the interest rate variable is marginally lower than in Table 3.4. In
Figure 3.8, we can see the actual and tted values for this regression along with the
new results of the recursive least squares estimation. This model shows a period of
undervaluation in the early-1990s with overvaluation emerging in the late-1980s and a
sustained period of overvaluation from late-1990s to 2007. The coecient on interest
rates is also relatively more stable than previously.
Given that the price and macro data are interpolated prior to the mid-1990s, the
long-run equation is re-estimated excluding the earlier period as a further robustness
check. As can be seen from Appendix 2, the long-run relationship remains signicant
with a relatively higher cyclical inuence on prices. The results also remain the same
if the crisis period is excluded. The residual from (3.17) is therefore used as the
non-fundamental price.
The second stage of the Engle-Granger approach incorporates the residuals of the
14The Bai-Perron (2003) algorithm tests for unknown breaks that minimise the sum of squared
residuals in a linear regression. The critical values for the number of breaks only applies to stationary
data (Estima, 2012).
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long-run cointegrating relationship into a short-run dynamic model of price changes.
Therefore prices respond to both deviations from long-run levels and other short-
run inuences. Table 3.5 shows the results of the error correction model. The LM
test for ARCH (2) and ARCH (4) reveals some evidence of heteroscedasticity in the
residuals. Therefore, Eicker-White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used.
The Breusch-Godfrey test for autorcorrelation in the residuals showed no evidence of
autocorrelation using AR (1) and AR (4). The Error Correction Term, ecmt 1 is
found to be signicant (albeit at the 8 per cent level) and negative. If there is a
deviation between actual and tted values last period, this deviation will be reduced
at a rate of 2 per cent per quarter. The second lag of economic growth and the lagged
dependent variable also exert an inuence on commercial property prices in the short
run.
To test the performance of the model, actual values of the explanatory variables
are used to simulate prices and price changes between 2012Q4 and 2013Q4. Figure 3.9
compares the predicted values with the actual out-turn for prices. The model captures
the rebound in prices but predicts a slightly faster recovery. This is our rst model
(i.e., Model A) for approximating bt.
ARDL model with credit
The cointegration approach showed periods of misalignment between actual and fun-
damental prices, indicating a possible role of non-fundamental inuences. However it
may be that some of the misalignment may be due to the omission of credit. This
section attempts to address this issue. Our second approach uses an Autoregressive
Distributed Lag (ARDL) specication. This model incorporates short-run inuences
from changes in income, real interest rates, corporate credit in addition to controlling
for lagged commercial property price growth. The change in the log unemployment
rate is used instead of GDP to proxy for occupier demand and is expected to have
negative inuence on future price changes. Bearing in mind the discussions in the pre-
vious section, the residential mortgage rate is used as the interest rate variable. The
following specication is used to estimate an ARDL(p; q) model in rst dierences:
4cpt = 0+
pX
i=1
i4cpt i+
qX
i=1
!i4uet i+
qX
i=1
#i4it i+
qX
i=1
i4credt i+ t (3.18)
where 4cpt is dierenced log real commercial property prices, 4uet is dierenced
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log unemployment rate, 4it is dierenced long-term real interest rates and 4credt is
dierenced log corporate credit.
The initial lag length for the explanatory variables q and for the lagged depen-
dent variable p was set at two. To reduce potential endogeneity, contemporaneous
values of unemployment, interest rates and corporate credit are not included in the
specication. Davis and Zhu (2011) nd that current commercial property prices also
exert an inuence on bank credit which is in line with their analytical framework.
Given the role of commercial property as collateral for most commercial-property
related exposures, price developments may inuence bank credit decisions in addi-
tion to causality running from credit to prices. Therefore to reduce any simultaneity
bias, lagged credit growth is preferred here. A general-to-specic approach is used
to obtain a parsimonious specication. All insignicant coecients are dropped se-
quentially until just the statistically insignicant constant remains. The results are
contained in Table 3.6.
The overall t of the model as estimated by the R2 is relatively high at 77 per cent.
As suspected, lagged values of the dependent variable exert a signicant inuence of
up two quarters on commercial property price changes showing that Irish commercial
property price changes are quite persistent. Changes in the unemployment rate are
found to be signicant and negatively related to prices. The credit variable is also
found to have a positive lagged eect on capital values. Misspecication testing on
the residuals from the ARDL model indicates evidence of autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) eects. Therefore we use heteroscedasticity robust stan-
dard errors. Figure 3.10 shows the actual and tted values of the regression along
with the residuals.
The tted values from the ARDL regression yield estimates of quarterly changes
in fundamental capital values. These quarterly changes are used to compute a fun-
damental price series using the price in 1984Q4 as the initial starting value. The
deviation between the actual prices and the fundamental price series is calculated to
approximate an alternative measure of pnft . Figure 3.12 shows that misalignment is
10 per cent or more in late-1980s, late-1990s/early-2000s and between 2004 and 2007.
These periods are in line with the results of the long-run model. The estimate of
misalignment is used as our second model (i.e., Model B) of bt.
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3.3.4 Statistical indicator of misalignment
To complement the formal econometric approaches, a measure of misalignment in
commercial property prices using the price-to-rent ratio is used. There should be a
long-run relationship between prices and rents as the latter proxies for the income
stream accruing to commercial property investors. Figure 3.11 shows prices and rents
for Irish commercial property over the sample (i.e., 1985Q1-2012Q4) along with the
price-to-rent ratio. The deviation from the ratio's long-run average is used as to mea-
sure misalignment. Using this approach, there is a sustained period of misalignment
prior to the Irish crisis which emerged in the mid-1990s.
This is the broadest measure of misalignment as no other determinants of prices are
taken into account. Also ECB (2011) notes that prices may be more responsive than
rental changes as the latter may be subject to xed contracts which could inuence
the degree of misalignment. This could be especially relevant in Ireland where certain
leases may be subject to upward-only rent reviews.
3.4 Testing between a fad and a rational bubble us-
ing switching models
In the previous section, we showed that there were a number of periods where actual
real commercial property prices deviated from our estimates of a fundamental price
series or approximations of misalignment. The SVN approach outlined in Section 3.2
is applied, to determine if these periods of misalignment suggest that Irish commercial
property prices were subject to a fad or a bubble over the sample period. There are,
however, two dierences between this empirical approach and that of SVN. First,
Markov switching rather than simple switching techniques are used. Second, SVN
assume that the probability of being in a survival state depends upon the size of the
bubble or misalignment. Here is it assumed that the transition probabilities are time
invariant.
Simple switching methods based on Goldfeld and Quandt (1976) are used by
SVN to estimate (3.12). This approach assumes a particular stochastic process for
the transition probabilities which is based on mixture normal distributions. The
probability of the occurrence of a particular state in period t is independent of the
prevailing state in period t   1. In the case of fads model (3.5), SVN assume that
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the volatility of the residuals moves randomly with the state and do not allow for
any persistence in stock market volatility. The authors concede that this assumption
may conict with some empirical evidence of equity price behaviour. With regard
to the bubble model (3.12), it is assumed that the probability of the bubble regime
surviving, (q) is a function of the relative size of the bubble (bt).
The institutional features of commercial property markets and preliminary exam-
ination of the Irish price data in subsection 3.3.2 suggest that an assumption of some
persistence may important. Although the random variable governing the switch be-
tween regimes is often unobserved, the use of a probabilistic model based on a Markov
chain imposes some structure on the data generating process for this random variable
(Hamilton, 2008). A rst order Markov chain implies that the probability that the
data process is in a particular regime or state at time t is dependent on the regime in
the previous period.
Prob[St = ij
t 1] = Prob[St = ijSt 1 = j] = pij (3.19)
where pij is the probability of moving from regime j to regime i and is subject to
0  pij  1 and
P2
j=1 pij = 1.
Constant rather than time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP) are assumed
for a number of reasons. First, it can be challenging to estimate the parameters of
the transition probability matrix accurately using TVTP, especially if there are only
a small number of switches between regimes (Hamilton, 2008). Second, the choice of
indicator series may be dicult. It is not clear if the proportionate size of the bubble
or misalignment, although plausible, would be the main factor determining regime
shifts in the commercial property market over the full sample.
As we have two states, one where the bubble survives (S) and one where the
bubble crashes (C), time invariant transition probabilities for a rst order Markov
chain are as follows,
Prob[St = sjSt 1 = s] = pss = q;
Prob[St = cjSt 1 = s] = pcs = 1  q;
Prob[St = cjSt 1 = c] = pcc = p;
Prob[St = sjSt 1 = c] = psc = 1  p:
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Although the levels equation is the same as SVN (3.12), the transition probabilities
dier. According to Van Norden (1996), if their model is estimated using Markov
rather than simple switching, similar dynamics may be captured, if there is a bubble.
The transitional probabilities in SVN are driven by proportionate size of the bubble
which can be serially correlated so results may be similar.
The equation for the general regime switching specication is once more;
Ri;t+1 = i;0 + i;bbt + ei;t+1; (3.21)
ei;t+1  N(0; 2i ); i = S;C
where Ri;t+1 is the quarterly log commercial property price return between time t
and t + 1, and bt is our estimated bubble term or non-fundamental price using our
three estimates of misalignment in section 3.3. To estimate this model, we need to
evaluate the conditional log likelihood function over our sample and maximise this
function with respect to the parameter set (i.e., i;0, i;b, 
2
i , p, q). The data are
forward ltered using an iterative algorithm based on Hamilton (1989) and estimated
using Maximum Likelihood. The log likelihood function (dropping terms which do
not aect the maximisation) is:
L =
TX
t=1
lnf(Rt+1j
t) (3.22)
where
f(Rt+1j
t) = f(Rt+1jSt+1 = i;
t)  P (St+1 = ij
t) (3.23)
and where
f(Rt+1jSt+1 = i;
t) = 1p
2i
exp

  (Ri;t+1   i;0   i;bbt)
2
22i

(3.24)
To test the validity of restrictions imposed by the fads model (3.5) Wald and
Likelihood Ratio tests are used. The empirical results are discussed in the next
section.
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3.4.1 Results
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 shows the results of the estimation of the general regime switching
(bubble) specication of quarterly log commercial property growth. The various mea-
sures of non-fundamental price or deviation between actual and fundamental prices
from Section 3.3 are included in the three columns.
The label Model A refers to the non-fundamental price recovered from the long-
run cointegrating relationship in the error correction model using GDP and interest
rates. The label Model B refers to the non-fundamental price based on the estimated
quarterly growth rates from the autoregressive distributed lag model using changes in
unemployment, credit and lagged commercial property price returns. The statistical
term represents our simple statistical measure of misalignment (i.e., deviation of the
price-to-rent ratio from its long-run average). Figure 3.12 compares the three ap-
proaches. As can be seen all three estimates are generally correlated over the sample
although there is a range of over/undervaluation across the models.
There is some evidence that the rational bubble hypothesis may be a good explana-
tion for Irish real commercial property prices over our sample. The Likelihood Ratio
test results in Table 3.8 show that we cannot accept the joint signicance that the
restrictions imposed by the Fads model are valid across the three approaches15. Also
the Wald Tests show that the equality of either the slope or the intercept coecients
across both regimes cannot be accepted at conventional statistical levels using Model
B and the statistical approach. Model A, however, suggests that the two estimated
slope coecients may not be statistically dierent.
Turning to the switching regressions in Table 3.7 the results are mixed. None of the
approaches have all statistically signicant point estimates for both the slope and the
intercept coecients in the two regimes. For Model A and the statistical approach,
c;b is statistically signicant and negative which is in line with the rational bubble
theory. However, the coecient s;b is not signicant in these two models. For Model
B, the coecient s;b has a negative sign. Expected returns should be higher in the
survival period so this result conicts with theory.
The last two rows in Table 3.7 show estimates for the transition probabilities. It
appears that the both regimes are quite persistent. The probability of staying in the
15The Wald test is asymptotically distributed with one degree of freedom, when the null is correct,
while the Likelihood Ratio test is asymptotically chi squared distributed with two degrees of freedom.
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survival regime ranges from 0.95 to 0.99 while the probability of staying the crash
regime is 0.89 to 0.95. The probability of moving to a crash regime from a survival
period is between 5 and 11 per cent based on the sample data. The estimates of this
probability is not statistically signicant for Model B. Based on Model A and the
statistical approach, the expected duration of the survival period is between 4 and
6 years while the expected duration of the crash period is between 2.25 to 5 years.
Over our sample, therefore there may be a number of regime switches.
Figures 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15 compare the smoothed probabilities of each regime
across all approaches. Smoothed probabilities allow us to infer which regime Irish
commercial property prices are in, on a given date, using information over the full
sample. Both Model A and the statistical approach display a number of switches
over the sample, suggesting that there might be a non-linear relationship between
price returns and speculative behaviour in the commercial property market. High
probabilities of the crash/high volatility regime are generally consistent across the
models although the timing varies. While Model A suggests that the data remain
in a crash regime from 2005 through 2012, the statistical approach suggests that the
probability of a the crash regime began to ease from 2011.
By contrast, Model B only displays one regime switch in 2007, suggesting that
Markov Switching techniques may not be an appropriate estimation technique for
the relationship between price returns and estimated fundamental prices from this
model. Also recall from Figure 3.12 that this approach did not yield clearly dened
periods of over and undervaluation unlike the other two approaches. Further, an
ARDL approach may be more applicable to estimating and forecasting prices rather
than determining deviations from equilibrium values.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter examines real price movements in the Irish commercial property market
over the period 1985Q1 to 2012Q4. Two reduced form models are specied and esti-
mated which incorporate theoretically motivated explanatory variables for commercial
property prices such as income, interest rates and credit. The models do not have a
supply side indicator given the lack of long-run Irish data on this side of the market.
Although these models are found to provide a good description of prices, there are
a number of periods where actual prices are found to persistently deviate from the
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estimated fundamental prices. As a fundamental commercial property price series is
unobservable, a suite of indicators is preferable for robustness. The chapter approxi-
mates a simple estimate of misalignment between actual and fundamental prices using
the price-to-rent ratio and its deviation from its historical average. Averaging across
the three approaches, Irish commercial property prices appear to be overvalued rela-
tive to fundamentally justied values in the early-1990s and between 2000 and 2008.
The results suggest undervaluation in the mid-1990s and from 2009/2010 to the end
of the sample, 2012Q4.
Informed by the stock price literature, this chapter also investigates the nature of
the estimated misalignment and tests whether Irish real commercial property prices
conform to the irrational fads hypothesis or the rational collapsing bubble theory
over the sample period. If Irish commercial property prices are subject to faddish
behaviour the deviation between actual and fundamental prices will have some ex-
planatory power for future prices changes. As the deviation is assumed to be tem-
porary, an increasing gap or positive price misalignment should lead to a decrease in
price returns. Herding behaviour among investors may be one possible explanation
for the existence of fads in the data. The stochastic bubble theory assumes that if a
bubble exists, investors incorporate this into their valuations for current prices. As
the probability of a bubble surviving increases, investors demand higher returns to
compensate for the potential losses when a crash occurs. Bubbles are thus the out-
come of self-fullling expectations about future prices. In both cases, the collective
action of investors lead to price spirals and periods where market prices rise above
fundamentals. Commercial property is also an investment asset so these stock price
theories are deemed applicable.
Using regime switching techniques, the fads hypothesis cannot be accepted. There-
fore, the alternative hypothesis of a rational bubble must be considered. Although
there is evidence of non-linearity, the empirical results for expected returns in each
regime do not fully conform to the stochastic bubble theory.
Further research could address a number of dierent avenues. As per Gurkaynak
(2008), one limitation of the approach in this chapter is that it assumes that there
is no regime switching in the fundamental determinants. Further work could address
this issue. Also there are a number of other possible tests for bubbles that rely on
univariate analysis of prices, using unit root tests (e.g., Taipalus, 2013) or regime
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switching analysis (e.g., Hall, Psaradakis and Sola, 1999). Both approaches could be
applied to the Irish property market to complement the analysis in this chapter.
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Figure 3.1: Irish real commercial property prices and real GDP: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Note:Prices are in logs while rates are in per cent per annum
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Figure 3.2: Irish real commercial property prices and real long-term interest
rates:1985Q1 to 2012Q4
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Corporate credit is used
Real Prices Real Credit
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Figure 3.3: Annual change in Irish real commercial property prices and in corporate
credit:1985Q1 to 2012Q4
ACF and PACF
ACF and PACF Graphs:credit
Data are in logs and in real terms
CORR PCORR
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
ACF and PACF Graphs: prices
Data are in logs and in real terms
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Data are in logs and in real terms
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ACF and PACF Graphs:interest rates
Data are in real terms
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Figure 3.4: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions: 1985Q1 to
2012Q4
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Figure 3.5: Long-run model of real Irish commercial property prices: 1985Q1 to
2012Q4
Estimated using Recursive Least Squares
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Figure 3.6: Recursive estimation of GDP and interest-rate coecient with 95% con-
dence intervals
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Figure 3.7: Irish real interest rates and ination: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Long-run model of commercial property prices
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Figure 3.8: Long-run model of Irish commercial property prices controlling for GDP
and mortgage rates: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
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Figure 3.9: Out-of-sample performance of ECM model: 2012Q4 to 2013:Q4
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Figure 3.10: Short-run model of Irish commercial property prices: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
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Figure 3.11: Commercial property prices and rents: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Data are a four-quarter moving average in this figure
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Figure 3.12: Estimates of deviation between actual and fundamental commercial prop-
erty prices: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
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Figure 3.13: Smoothed probabilities using Model A: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Smoothed probabilities using model B
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Figure 3.14: Smoothed probabilities using Model B: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
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Smoothed Probabilities using price/rent ratio
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Figure 3.15: Smoothed probabilities using price-to-rent ratio: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Table 3.1: Summary statistics: 1985Q2 to 2012Q4
Variable No. of Observations Mean Standard Error Minimum Maximum
4cp 111 -0.05 4.16 -19.00 8.66
4cred 111 1.54 4.02 -15.98 8.68
4gdp 111 1.13 3.24 -6.31 10.88
4i 111 -0.05 1.12 -3.33 5.07
4rent 111 -0.13 2.37 -8.51 5.01
4ue 111 -0.14 5.39 -15.25 23.05
Note: All variables are in real terms and data are quarterly. 4cpt refers to rst dierenced log
commercial property prices. 4gdpt is rst dierenced log GDP. 4credt is rst dierenced log
corporate credit while4it is rst dierenced interest rates. 4ue is rst dierenced log unemployment
and 4rent is rst dierenced log rent. Commercial property prices, rent, GDP, corporate credit,
rent and unemployment are expressed in 100 times rst dierenced logs (i.e., approximately quarterly
percentage change) while interest rates are levels dierenced (i.e., in percentage points).
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Table 3.2: Tests for unit roots
Dickey-Fuller Philips-Perron
Variable 4 Lags 2 Lags Test Statistic MacKinnon p-value
4cpt -3.25++ -2.76++ -2.99 0.04
4gdpt -2.51 -5.42+++ -14.13 0.00
4credt -2.18 2.54 -5.06 0.00
4it -6.67+++ -5.80 +++ -8.49 0.00
4uet -2.40 -2.95 ++ -3.94 0.00
Note: +++ refers to rejection at 1% level, ++ denotes rejection at 5% and + at 10% level.
4cpt refers to rst dierenced log commercial property prices. 4gdpt is rst dierenced log
GDP. 4credt is rst dierenced log corporate credit while 4it is rst dierenced interest
rates. 4uet is the rst dierenced log unemployment. All variables are in real terms. Data
are quarterly and cover the period 1985Q1 through 2012Q4. Four lags and a constant are
included the Philips-Perron Tests.
Table 3.3: Tests for Cointegration
Johansen Trace Statistic
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value
0 42.81 29.68
1 14.68 15.41
2 0.059 3.76
Johansen Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value
0 28.13 20.97
1 14.62 14.07
2 0.059 3.76
Note: This table shows the results of running Johansen tests for cointegration on log commercial
property prices, log GDP and interest rates, all in real terms over the period 1985Q1 to 2012Q4.
Four lags are used based on the Akaike Information Criterion. A constant is included.
Table 3.4: Long-run model of Irish real commercial property prices: 1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Dependent variable: cpt
OLS FM-OLS
constant 6.85 7.43
(14.18) (12.33)
gdpt 0.35 0.29
(7.61) (5.17)
it -0.07 -0.08
(-10.16) (-9.45)
Bai-Perron Break Point 2009:04
Note: Absolute t-statistics in brackets. gdpt refers to log real GDP while it is long-term real interest
rates. FM-OLS refers to Fully Modied OLS and is due to Philips and Hansen (1990).
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Table 3.5: Long- and short-run model of Irish real commercial property prices: 1985Q1
to 2012Q4
Dependent variable: cpt
constant 6.71
(8.04)
gdpt 0.35
(4.52)
it -0.05
(-4.53)
Dependent variable: 4cpt
ecmt 1 -0.02
(-1.78)
4cpt 1 0.85
(8.63)
4gdpt 2 0.16
(2.39)
R2 0.78
Note: Absolute t-statistics in brackets. The Engle-Granger (1987) two-step approach to error cor-
rection modelling is used. Heteroscedasticity-Consistent (Eicker-White) Standard Errors used in
short-run model. gdpt refers to log real GDP and it is long-term real interest rates as proxed by the
mortgage rate. ecmt 1 is the error correction term, 4cpt 1 refers to quarterly lagged changes in
commercial property prices and 4gdpt 2 is the second lag of GDP growth.
125
Table 3.6: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model of commercial property prices:
1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Dependent variable: 4lcpt
variable Coecient
(t statistics)
constant -0.002
(-1.091))
4cpt 1 0.886
(6.021)
4cpt 2 -0.234
(-1.868)
4rcredt 2 0.108
(1.736)
4uet 1 -0.148
(-2.450)
R2 0.77
Note: Data are quarterly and in real terms. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors used.
4cpt i refers to lagged commercial property price changes, 4rcredt 2 is the second lag of credit
growth and 4uet 1 is lagged unemployment growth.
Table 3.7: General Regime Switching model of Irish commercial property prices:
1985Q3 to 2012Q4
Various estimates of bt
Model A Model B Statistical
s;0 -0.007 -0.005 0.004
(-2.20) (-1.16) (1.22)
c;0 -0.011 0.23 0.043
(-0.86) (4.91) (3.33)
s;b 0.010 -0.094 -0.010
(1.22) (-5.31) (-0.86)
c;b -0.10 0.49 -0.14
(-1.65) (2.98) (-2.01)
P (S; S) 0.95 0.99 0.96
(30.38) (111.56) (41.04)
P (S;C) 0.05 0.02 0.11
(1.85) (0.69) (2.05)
Note: Dependent variable is change in quarterly log commercial property prices while bt is the
estimated non-fundamental component of prices. Absolute t-statistics are in brackets. Model A
controls for income and interest rates. Model B focuses on short-run determinants and controls for
changes in lagged unemployment, changes in lagged corporate credit and changes in lagged price
eects. Statistical uses the deviation between the price/rent ratio and its long-run average. Survival
regime S is the low volatility period. P(S, C) is the prob. of moving from regime C to regime S.
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Table 3.8: Testing the restrictions imposed by the fads models
Model A Model B Statistical
p-values for Wald Test
HO : s;0 = c;0 0.00 0.00 0.00
HO : s;b = c;b 0.37 0.00 0.06
p-values for Likelihood Ratio Test
HO:Restrictions are valid 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.7 Appendices
Appendix 1: Data issues
The commercial price data used in this study cover the period 1984 through 2012.
As quarterly data are only available from the rst quarter of 1995 from SCS/IPD,
annual index data from 1984 are interpolated to form a historical quarterly series.
Two methods of linear interpolation were considered. First, we use a simple linear
interpolation method. This method constrains the average of the values in each
quarter to be the last value in the annual data. This process yields a very smooth
series and tracks the annual data quite well. We also interpolated the price data using
an indicator series. The diculty with this method lies in the subjective choice of
the indicator series and data availability. The growth in new house prices provided a
benchmark. The house price data are from the Department of the Environment. The
below Figure shows the two series. The interpolated series using house prices is quite
volatile and so the series using the linear interpolation is chosen.
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Appendix 2: Robustness checks
Given that both the commercial property data and GDP data were interpolated before
the mid-1990s, the long-run OLS specication controlling for income and interest
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rates are re-run, excluding data before 1995 as a robustness check. The results in
Table 3.9 show that the point estimates for log real GDP and real interest rates
remain signicant and correctly signed. What is noticeable is that the elasticity with
respect to GDP is relatively higher at 0.6 compared with 0.3 over the full sample
(i.e., 1985Q1 to 2012Q4). The point estimate for real interest rate coecient remains
unchanged.
Recall from this chapter's introduction that the Irish systemic banking crisis had
signicant real eects and the commercial property market adjusted quite rapidly from
the peak in 2007Q3/Q4. In addition to the parameter stability tests, the long-run
specication is also estimated excluding the crisis period as a further check. Therefore
the estimation is conducted over the period 1985Q1 to 2006Q4. Table 3.9 shows that
the results remain unchanged. The sensitivity of Irish real commercial property prices
to the business cycle is clear across all samples. The relatively higher elasticity with
respect to GDP since the mid-1990s and in the pre-crisis period may be reective of
the strong performance of the Irish economy during this time.
Table 3.9: Long-run model of Irish real commercial property prices
Dependent variable: cpt
1985Q1 to 2012Q4 1995Q1 to 2012Q4 1985Q1 to 2006Q4
constant 6.71 4.56 4.47
(8.04) (3.04) (6.25)
gdpt 0.35 0.56 0.57
(4.52) (3.96) (8.52)
it -0.05 -0.06 -0.03
(-4.53) (-4.03) (-3.63)
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is log real commercial property
price. gdpt refers to log real GDP and it is long-term real interest rates.
Appendix 3: Testing for alternative long-run determinants
Supply elasticity or tax issues may have a signicant impact on price. To control
for possible supply side eects in the long run, an alternative specication using real
investment is also estimated. As real investment and real GDP are likely highly cor-
related or co-linear in the Irish case, the log of the unemployment rate is used instead
to control for potential income returns. An increase in unemployment may reduce
the potential demand for oce, retail or industrial space. A reduction in occupier
demand may reduce future rental growth and constrain the investment return. In
Davis and Zhu (2011), an increase in investment generally leads to an increase in
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prices although in the long-run, the relationship may also be negative depending on
supply. The elasticity of the supply responses can determine the duration of property
cycles. Short-run real interest rates are also included to capture the opportunity cost
of nance.
A simple variant of the user cost of capital is also included instead of short rates
in an alternative specication drawing on the housing literature (Browne, Conefrey
and Kennedy, 2013). The user cost of capital comprises a number of components
such as expected capital gains/losses, depreciation, cost of nance and tax treatment.
The latter component is considered an important driver of demand for commercial
property and favourable tax treatment played a key role in Irish commercial property
in the pre-crisis period. Unfortunately a full treatment of the tax for commercial
property investment over the period 1985 to 2012 is beyond the scope of this thesis.
It is also assumed that depreciation is constant over the sample. Therefore the real
lending rate minus the expected future capital gains/losses is used to proxy the user
cost of capital (Kennedy and McQuinn, 2012). Given the potential for myopia in
property investment, a weighted average of the previous four quarters of prices is
assumed for expected future capital gains/losses. In empirical studies on the housing
market a strong negative relationship is found between house prices and the user cost
of capital. Given that commercial property is primarily an investment asset, we also
expect a negative relationship.
Table 3.10 shows the results. Across all specications a negative relationship is
found between unemployment rate and prices, while investment appears to have a
positive impact on prices. The coecient on both the short-term interest rate and
the user cost of capital is found to be positive which conicts with theory. Davis and
Zhu (2011) nd a positive long-run relationship between short-run interest rates and
prices in some markets.
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Table 3.10: Alternative long-run models of Irish real commercial property
prices:1985Q1 to 2012Q4
Dependent variable: cpt
1 2
constant 8.14 8.12
(19.61) (19.51)
uet -0.45 -0.45
(-12.40) (-12.39)
investt 0.34 0.34
(8.31) (8.32)
rsrt 0.02
(3.80)
usert 0.017
(3.81)
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is log real commercial property
price. uet refers to log unemployment rate, investt is log real investment, rsrt is real short-
run interest rate, usert is a simple proxy for the user cost of capital.
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Concluding Remarks
In light of the recent global nancial crisis, empirical research on banks and asset
price bubbles is a priority for academics and policy-makers in the nancial stability
eld. Drawing on standard banking and nancial asset pricing theory, this thesis tests
a number of hypotheses using novel Irish data over the period 1985 to 2013.
Although the empirical work relates to Ireland, the results will be of general inter-
est. Economists and policy-makers are focused on developing their analytical frame-
work to support macro-prudential policy discussions. Macro-prudential policy aims
to prevent and mitigate systemic risk and is top of the international nancial sta-
bility agenda after the global nancial crisis. The original research on funding risk
and property price bubbles in this thesis contributes to this eld. The unwinding of
a leveraged commercial property boom and bank funding diculties played impor-
tant roles, among other factors, in the Irish crisis. Such factors are also common to
other episodes of systemic stress in advanced economies. Therefore analysis of both
commercial property price developments over the cycle and the dynamic behaviour of
deposits during a period of systemic stress expands our understanding of the origins
and propagation of systemic nancial crises.
In chapters one and two, the thesis draws on a unique high-frequency database
of customer deposits in Irish banks over the period 2009 through 2013. Customer
deposits are an important funding category for retail or commercial banks. Although
volatility is observed in the weekly growth rates, deposit levels appear relatively stable
during the early stages of the Irish banking crisis (i.e., March 2009 to August 2010).
By specifying a model of of corporate deposits over this period of relative stability,
a number of research questions are addressed. In line with market discipline theory
are corporate depositors sensitive to measures of banking sector risk? Do sovereign
risk factors play a role up to August 2010? Will stress in other funding markets such
as the interbank market impact corporate deposits, thereby reducing diversication
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possibilities? Using time-series methods, chapter one shows that corporate depositors
can impose market discipline by reacting to measures of bank nancial soundness and
that there are contagion channels across funding markets.
Extending the sample out to early-2014, chapter two investigates the issue of
deposit volatility and the determinants of weekly customer deposit ows. Two distinct
volatility regimes are found, namely a high volatility regime up to early December
2010 and low volatility regime from December 2010 to end-2013. The timing of this
regime shift coincides with Ireland's application for external nancial assistance in
late-November 2010. A possible conclusion is that depositors were uncertain about the
default risk posed by the Irish banks up to Ireland's entry into an external programme
and this uncertainty manifested itself in inows/outows into Irish bank deposits.
Evidence of a GARCH-in-Mean eect and a negative relationship between the deposit
ows and their conditional variance suggest an empirical link between higher volatility
and risk aversion. Beyond August 2010, the Irish banking crisis intensies with the
emergence of the European sovereign debt crisis. In line with this development, the
empirical analysis in this chapter show that measures of both banking sector risk and
sovereign risk have individual explanatory power for weekly deposit changes.
During the early stages of the Irish banking crisis, there was anecdotal evidence
that corporate deposits were less stable than retail deposits and therefore posed a
higher renancing risk. However, the nancial crisis literature is replete with theory
and evidence of retail deposit runs during periods of systemic stress. Further the se-
quencing of modern bank runs is such that more-informed funding providers run rst,
followed by retail depositors as the crisis deepens. This thesis tests these hypotheses
and provides evidence that retail depositors display more inertia up to a certain point.
In the Irish case, the turning point was August 2010 as both the creditworthiness of
both the Irish sovereign and the Irish banks deteriorated. After this date, outows
were recorded for both retail and corporate deposits. This research also provides
empirical support for the relatively higher volatility of corporate deposit ows and
evidence of volatility spill-overs from corporate to retail deposit ows during a crisis.
In chapter three, the dynamic behaviour of real commercial property prices is
investigated over the period 1985Q1 to 2012Q4. Sharp corrections in commercial
property prices have preceded many episodes of nancial crisis, particularly if the
preceding price appreciation was funded by credit and private-sector leverage. Unlike
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housing markets, data on commercial property market developments are relatively
scare and often not freely available due to its commercial value. Research on com-
mercial property prices is therefore conned to relatively transparent markets such as
the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, although there have been a few
cross-country studies using subscription data from private-sector sources. Bridging
these data and analytical gaps is a priority among national systemic risk analysts.
In Ireland, to the author's knowledge, there has been limited published empirical
research on commercial property price movements. Therefore, chapter three inves-
tigates the role of possible fundamental determinants such as income, interest rates
and credit in explaining Irish real commercial property prices over the sample period.
Given potential model uncertainty, a number of approaches are used.
Broadly similar periods of misalignment from fundamentally determined prices are
found across these approaches. In all cases, commercial property prices are found to
be persistently overvalued prior to the market peak and subsequent price collapse from
late-2007. Drawing on asset pricing literature, these periods of misalignment are used
to test between the rational bubble theory and the irrational fad hypothesis, using
regime switching techniques. Although the results are not fully conclusive, evidence of
non-linearity in expected price returns suggest that Irish commercial property prices
may be subject to bubble-like behaviour. This result suggests that self-fullling ex-
pectations may have a role in explaining price growth in this market. Investors may
be aware of the unsustainable nature of commercial property price booms but high
capital gains are attractive and they may assume they will exit before the crash.
There are a number of possible avenues for further work across both aspects of this
research. With regard to funding stress, contagion within the banking sector could be
investigated both in terms of deposit ows and their volatility. Certain fundamental
determinants of commercial property prices such as GDP or credit may be subject
to structural change or regime switches over the sample. Finally, regime switching
methods are just one possible option for testing for asset price bubbles. Further
extensions could involve univariate analysis of commercial property prices using unit
root tests.
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